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INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY 
THE PURPOSE OF MY DISSERTATION.  
Family firms constitute the predominant corporate form throughout the world as well as 
the backbone of the private economy (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2003; 
Zellweger, 2017), and therefore provide a very large and attractive deal pool for private 
equity sponsors (Dawson, 2011). Business-owning families share the desire to maintain 
control over the company (Chua et al., 1999; Poutziouris, 2001) and seek to build a com-
petitive advantage across generations by successfully transmitting family’s influenced set 
of assets (Barbera et al., 2018). However, in many cases they lack the internal financial 
and managerial resources necessary to grow and thrive in fast-changing, globally-con-
nected industries (Romano et al., 2001; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003); also, they often struggle 
with the generational change (Miller et al., 2003). By providing the necessary financial 
resources and managerial capabilities, private equity investors may help family busi-
nesses to cope with their challenges, likely unlocking a greater potential as compared to 
investments in non-family firms, ultimately creating a win-win situation. Nevertheless, 
the opposing logics, values, and objectives to which the two economic actors adhere seem 
to impede ex-ante the closing of potentially mutually beneficial deals, or, ex-post, to in-
validate the creation of synergies that might positively affect targets’ results. The purpose 
of this dissertation is to add empirical evidence regarding the level of interaction between 
family firms and private equity funds as well as to assess the impact of family firms’ 
buyouts on targets’ financial performance. To this end, an analysis of the existing litera-
ture on the topic is firstly presented. Second, data on the actual level of interaction be-
tween private equity and family firms in the Italian scenario, which may be considered as 
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a proxy of the “reciprocal sympathy”, are showed; then, a sample of 60 Italian family 
firms’ buyouts completed between 2014 and 2016 by national and international private 
equity investors is thoroughly investigated, considering both accounting and non-ac-
counting data. In particular, for the selected sample of deals, we commit to assess what is 
the impact on target’s growth, efficiency, capital structure and profitability. Finally, we 
investigate under which circumstances these deals tend to achieve better results.  
CHAPTER 1. The current work starts by focusing on the peculiarities of private equity 
investments. The main goal of Chapter 1 is to answer some questions related to the private 
equity activity, i.e. what exactly is private equity? Why are private equity firms relevant? 
How do they operate? What impact do they have on target companies? Firstly, it provides 
a broad explanation of how private equity firms are structured and whom they collect 
money from. In particular, it stresses the differences between traditional investment funds 
and private equity funds as well as those between the main types of deals made within the 
private equity industry, namely venture capital and buyouts (Talmor and Vasvari, 2011). 
Secondly, it presents a review of the literature on the main changes applied by private 
equity sponsors on portfolio companies, identifying four macro areas of intervention i.e. 
financial, governance, operational and cultural (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Castellan-
eta et al., 2018). Finally, it shows evidence about portfolio companies’ performance, that 
is the impact that private equity sponsors have on their targets.  
 CHAPTER 2. After providing an overview about how private equity works and the im-
pact that private equity investors have on investee companies, the dissertation continues 
by contextualising the private equity activity in the world of family businesses. Family 
businesses are thus presented and defined in the first part of the chapter with the purpose 
of overcoming common stereotypes associated to them and gaining an in-depth compre-
hension of the phenomenon. In detail, the discussion develops around the common family 
firms’ definitions proposed by the literature, the most important influence dimensions 
shaping family firms e.g. the family, the business and the ownership (Tagiuri and Davis, 
1996) and, last, how the interplay of these dimensions affect the set of decisions taken by 
business-owning families, especially with regard to financing choices. As a matter of fact, 
family firms do not seem to follow the general laws of corporate finance when in need of 
additional capital (Zellweger, 2017), but rather family members’ personal preferences 
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(Gallo et al., 2004; Koropp et al., 2014) mainly linked to the preservation of controlling 
interests (Poutziouris, 2001). Such demeanour, together with the Socio Emotional Wealth 
(SEW) loss aversion characterizing owning-families, the common pursuit of non-finan-
cial goals (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007), and the willingness to maintain stewardship roles 
(Davis et al., 2010), paint a reality that appears far away and in deep contrast with the one 
of the private equity industry. Nonetheless, with the goal of understanding also what ac-
tually links family firms to private equity funds and vice versa, the remaining part of the 
chapter provides an analysis of the mutual advantages the two actor can access through 
buyout deals. Last, the chapter delves into other evidence: first, it provides some data on 
the existing “reciprocal feeling”, in terms of number of transactions between private eq-
uity sponsors and family firms; then, it shows what impact private equity investments 
have had on family firms over the last decades. 
CHAPTER 3. The aim of this chapter is that of adding evidence to the existing literature 
presented in the previous chapter regarding the engagement levels of private equity and 
family firms, consequently addressing part of our research question. In order to do so, it 
performs a detailed analysis of the Italian private equity scenario, highlighting the con-
sistently growing relevance of the industry on the one hand, and the great feeling it has 
with family firms on the other. The analysis, which is based on data provided by PEMÒ 
for the years from 2014 to 2018, will cover many aspects including, for instance, type of 
deal origination, deal investment stage, deal geographical concentration, and target finan-
cials. 
CHAPTER 4. The fourth and last chapter directly addresses the main question of this 
dissertation: do private equity investments improve financial performance in family 
firms? It does so by carrying out an empirical analysis of 60 family firms’ buyouts com-
pleted in Italy between 2014 and 2016, both by Italian and international private equity 
houses. More specifically, the work focuses on the most relevant aspects of performance 
as presented in target firms’ financial reports in the years pre and post-deal, namely 
growth (in terms of sales and number of employees),  efficiency (EBITDA margin, oper-
ating net working capital, ROA, ROS, and employees’ productivity), capital structure 
(financial debt and taxes),  and profitability (net income and ROE). The results are then 
discussed, contributing in this way to the existing evidence on the topic discussed in 
Do private Equity Investments improve financial performance in Family Firms? Evidence from Italy. 
4 
Chapter 2. Also, in the remaining part of the chapter we identify 3 groups of companies 
based on the performance achieved in the years following the deal, allowing for an inves-
tigation of the factors that might distinguish a priori successful family firms’ buyouts 
cases from probable failures. 
 
1. CHAPTER  
PRIVATE EQUITY AND BUSINESS IMPACTS 
1.1 Introduction 
The private equity industry is becoming more and more important worldwide: according 
to most recent global data, in 2019 the total value of private equity investments increased 
of 10% from the previous year, reaching $582 billion and capping the strongest five-year 
run in the history of the industry (Bain&Company, 2019). In Europe alone, the total pri-
vate equity amount invested in portfolio companies also increased by 10% year-on-year, 
reaching €94 billion in 2019, which represents the highest value ever recorded (Invest 
Europe, 2020).  
Such an increasing role played by private equity actors in recent years has rapidly gener-
ated a considerable interest within scholars who have been studying their characteristics 
under many point of views. To be more precise, of particular interests have been issues 
regarding not only the investing private equity firms but also the investee companies and 
their impact on society as a whole. For instance, some of these scholars focused on the 
effects on target performance resulting from ownership concentration (Jensen, 1989), the 
effect on sales and employment growth (e.g. Wilson et al., 2012), the effect on investee’s 
cash flows, profitability, size and productivity (e.g. Guo et al., 2011; Kaplan, 1989; Scel-
lato and Ughetto, 2013), or the ability of private equity funds to generate persistent returns 
(Braun et al., 2016). 
But what exactly is private equity? How do private equity firms operate? what impact do 
they have on target companies? These are some of the main topics explored in this chap-
ter, which has the goal of providing an in-depth comprehension of the private equity phe-
nomenon. In order to do so, the discussion begins with a broad definition of private equity 
as a particular type of asset class and continues with a more detailed analysis of private 
equity firms’ activities and private equity funds’ peculiarities with respect to traditional 
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ones (section 1.2). Then, from paragraph 1.2.1 to 1.2.3, the focus shifts to the character-
istics of  private equity firms in terms of their organizational structure and functioning, in 
terms of  types of transactions that they carry out and in terms of how they end (or exit) 
their investments. Following, in section 1.3 a detailed overview of how private equity 
firms improve the financial performance of the investees is discussed. In particular, gov-
ernance value drivers are covered in paragraph 1.3.1, financial value drivers in 1.3.2, op-
erational value drivers in 1.3.3 and other value drivers in 1.3.4. Last, in section 1.4, an 
analysis of the current literature about portfolio companies’ performance is showed. 
1.2 Private Equity  
In a very broad sense, “private equity is the name given to that part of the asset manage-
ment industry where investments are made into securities which are usually not quoted 
in the public markets” (Talmor and Vasvari, 2011). More in particular, Invest Europe, 
formerly known as the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA), defines the private equity activity as follows:  
«Private equity makes long-term investments into small, medium and large 
companies with the aim of making them bigger, stronger and more profita-
ble. Specialist investment managers with intimate knowledge of running 
companies help to build better businesses by strengthening management, 
improving operations and expanding into new markets. The profits of the 
improvement are shared among the underlying investors and the specialists 
whose skills contributed to the company's success. Venture capital is pri-
vate equity investment that is focused on start-up companies. VCs back en-
trepreneurs who have bright ideas but need finance and expertise to get 
their companies off the ground and grow.» (Invest Europe, n.d.). 
As further explained in the following sections, the investments to which the definition 
above refers to initiate by raising private equity funds i.e. financial instruments that col-
lect resources from specific types of individuals and organizations. Consequently, the 
main role of  private equity (firms) is to provide investment advice to the private equity 
funds - created in joint partnership with the investors - in order to deploy the amount of 
resources  gathered into the above mentioned activities. Such firms, which act as a general 
partner of the funds, also execute the investments decisions, oversee the funds’ invest-
ments, and receive fees for these services (see section 1.2.1 for further details).  
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At the end of 1980s, private equity firms were described as lean, decentralized organiza-
tions: on average, they were composed of just more than 10 investment professionals and 
employees, mostly coming from an investment banking background (Jensen, 1989). In 
more recent years instead, the average private equity firm is more structured, sometimes 
hiring more than 100 investment professionals coming with a largely wider set of skills 
and experiences as compared to the late 1980s (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). The rea-
sons for such development are most likely linked to the evolution of the private equity 
activity, which underwent a progressive shift from a financial focus only for its invest-
ments to an integration of financial and operating aspects, as explained in the upcoming 
sections of this chapter. However, before going more in details on the operating features 
of such firms, noteworthy is how private equity funds largely differ from traditional in-
vestment funds.  
Traditional investment funds are defined by the European Commission as follows: 
 «Investment funds are investment products created with the sole purpose of 
gathering investors' capital, and investing that capital collectively through 
a portfolio of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds and other securi-
ties.» (European Commission, n.d. a) 
Therefore, if we compare the investments - and the investments in stocks in particular - 
between the two funds, great differences clearly emerge. Indeed, private equity fund man-
agers normally aim at controlling the businesses they participate in, steering them in the 
directions explained by the definition of Invest Europe. Whereas, traditional fund man-
agers collect only small minority stakes of the companies they invest in, without pretend-
ing to have an impact on their activities. Coherently, private equity fund managers operate 
with much more information, control and ability to influence the incumbent management 
as compared to traditional funds managers (CACEIS, 2010). A summary of these and 
other differences between the two type of funds can be found in Figure 1 below: 
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Next, from paragraph 1.2.1 to 1.2.3 we will focus on how private equity firms are orga-
nized, how the funds are raised and how long they last, how the actors involved are re-
munerated for their work and the risks taken and, finally, on how private equity firms 
typically exit from the investments they make. 
1.2.1 Organizational structure and functioning  
Normally, a private equity firm is organized as a partnership or a limited liability com-
pany (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). The limited partners - pension funds, banks, endow-
ments, high-net-worth-individuals, family offices, etc. - provide the equity capital to the 
private equity firm, which is managed by the general partners. The total amount of capital 
already in the fund (together with the amount promised to the fund) is called “committed 
capital” and, on average, the investment period or “commitment period” lasts five years, 
while the life of the fund is normally ten years since it also includes the so called “harvest 
period” (Iannotta, 2010; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). This means that the Private Equity 
firm has five years to invest the committed capital into target companies and an additional 
period of five years to return the capital to the limited partners. However, the life of the 
fund in certain cases can be extended for a period up to three additional years (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2009).  
During the investment period, the general partners look for and implement investments 
opportunities in line with the fund’s vision. When they identify an appealing investment 
they “call” money from the limited partners (up to the committed amount) and devolve it 
Figure 1: Private equity fund versus traditional fund 
Source: Adapted from CACEIS (2010) 
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to the target company. In the industry such capital calls are referred to as “drawdowns” 
and they contribute to the building of the fund’s portfolio, namely the group of target 
companies (Iannotta, 2010). Notice that “after committing their capital, the limited part-
ners have little say in how the general partner deploys the investment funds, as long as 
the basic covenants of the fund agreement are followed” (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). 
During the harvest period instead, the general partners exit the investments of the fund 
and distribute the net returns to the investors. Investors may receive the proceeds from 
the investment either in shares or cash. Also, the distribution of such proceeds between 
them and the general partners normally follow a waterfall approach, meaning that first, 
the limited partners will be given back the capital invested in the fund, second, investors 
might be paid an extra return on that capital, and third, after the first and second point 
have been satisfied the general partners can start to collect the carried interest (Talmor 
and Vasvari, 2011) (see below for an explanation of the carried interest).  
To make a fund attractive not only must the fundamental investment strategy appear solid 
but the limited partners must believe in proper alignment of interest between them and 
the general partners. According to Talmor and Vasvari (2011), the alignment is normally 
achieved in several ways, for instance: 1) reputation; 2) equity interest; 3) incentive 
scheme; 4) direct control mechanisms. In detail: 
1) Reputation: limited partners value general partners who were able to achieve a con-
sistent and favourable track record in raising new funds. Also, they seek funds that are 
persistent in their performance, contrary to what happens in the public market. Thus, rep-
utation and the ability to meet stated objectives in the long run is a critical factor for any 
fund; 
2) Equity interest: in order to avoid conflicts of interest, general partners usually have 
their “skin in the game”, namely they contribute to raise a share - in general no less than 
1% and up to 10% -  of the total equity capital of the fund; 
3) Incentive schemes: general partners receive compensation based on the performance 
of the fund. Under such pay-for-performance scheme the largest share of their expected 
compensation come from the profits made on the investments, the so called “carried in-
terest”. However, the general partners are commonly compensated in other ways: first, 
they receive a management fee of around 2% of the committed capital. Second, they 
eventually collect a share - around 20% - of the profits of the fund, which is the already 
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mentioned “carried interest” (in the industry, this is known as the 2 - 20 fee structure). 
Third, some general partners may charge a deal or monitoring fee on their investments; 
4) Direct control mechanisms: limited partners normally secure direct control mechanism 
over the private equity fund and participate in the advisory board. Such control mecha-
nisms often foresee the adoption of specific covenants that place restrictions on a fund’s 
investments and on other activities of the general partners; for example, some covenants 
introduce limits on the percentage of the fund’s capital that can be invested in a single 
target firm. Covenants may also preclude investments in publicly traded and foreign se-
curities, derivatives, other private equity funds, and private equity investments that devi-
ate significantly from the partnership’s primary focus. 
To conclude, Figure 2 below synthetically illustrates the functioning of a private equity 
firm: 
Figure 2: Functioning of a private equity firm 
Source: Talmor and Vasvari (2011) 
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1.2.2 Transactions  
As can be understood from the definition provided above, private equity firms operate 
through many different transaction types, the most common areas of distinction being 
venture capital and buyout investments (Talmor and Vasvari, 2011).  
Following the European definition, venture capital investments are not meant to buy an 
existing business but rather to fund the development of a new one: their role is to fill the 
gap between the need of funds for innovation and the traditional sources of capital (Zider, 
1998). They do so in three different stages of a business: early-stage, expansion-stage and 
late stage (Iannotta, 2010), for which an explanation is also given in Figure 3 below. In a 
nutshell, the venture capital strategy focuses on “building businesses by investing in com-
panies in the conceptual stage or companies where products have not yet been fully de-
veloped and where revenues and/or profits may be several years away” (CACEIS, 2010).  
Consistently with the high level of risk involved in these type of deals, venture capitalists 
expect a rapid internal growth and a high rate of return, normally between 25% and 35% 
(Zider, 1998). Venture capital investments play an important role especially in the US, 
while in the European market their activity is still marginal (Iannotta, 2010).  
On the other hand, buyout investments represents the largest category of private equity 
activities in terms of funds under management worldwide and, contrary to venture capital 
deals, they generally target mature firms in the late stages of their lifecycle (Iannotta, 
2010). In a typical buyout, the acquisition of the target company is carried out mainly by 
borrowing financial resources, with the typical financing structure composed by a 25-
50% part of equity and  the remaining 75-50% part of debt (Iannotta, 2010). Other authors 
noticed that the level of debt might also consist of 60-90% of the total capital of the target 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), hence the often heard term leveraged buyout. However, 
after the credit crunch that followed the 2008 financial crisis, the latter levels are less 
likely to be observed since private equity firms were force to use lower level of leverage 
in their operations (CACEIS, 2010). 
As a consequence of the average high levels of debt involved, not all firms are suitable 
for a buyout and specific characteristics are required in the potential targets. Consistently, 
Talmor and Vasvari (2011) and Iannotta (2010) identify the (perfect) buyout candidate in 
a firm that presents predictable strong cash flows, growth opportunities, and a strong asset 
base. Going more in depth, predictable and stable cash flows are necessary to service 
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interests and principal repayments linked to debt contracts. Thus, buyout investors look 
for a company that have the following features which, among others, are generally linked 
to stable cash flows (Talmor and Vasvari, 2011):  
- A long history of stable operating cash flows 
- A leading or defensible market position 
- Strong brand names 
- Stable customers’ demand.  
Following, growth opportunities that can be generated by the private equity funds ensure 
that the target company will be able to grow during the holding period. This accelerates 
debt reimbursement and, thanks to the generation of higher EBITDA allows the company 
to meet all debt covenants. However, since the outstanding debt is reimbursed only when 
growth is actually realized, it is more difficult to convince banks to finance this type of 
buyouts (Iannotta, 2010).  
Last, a strong asset base (namely a large amount of tangible assets with high market val-
ues and high levels of liquidity) is often required since it facilitates the raising of debt at 
more convenient conditions. The main reason is that banks offering debt can use such 
asset base as a collateral, therefore lowering their risk on loans. Plus, a strong asset base 
is also seen as a barrier to entry for potential competitors, which contributes to strengthen 
cash flows (Talmor and Vasvari, 2011).  
Another important aspect that differentiates buyouts from venture capital investments is 
the amount of equity stake bought. Indeed, most buyouts acquire a majority stake in their 
targets, whereas venture capitalists normally focus on minority investments.  
A non-exhaustive summary of the main differences between venture capital and buyout 
investments can also be found in Figure 3 below. 
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Apart from the definitions and concepts proposed above, in order to better understand the 
analysis that will be made in Chapter 3 and 4 it is now useful to introduce the type of 
transactions to which the Private Equity Monitor (PEM®) - an Italian observatory of the 
private equity market - refers, namely: 1) Expansion, 2) Replacement, 3) Turnaround, and 
4) Buyout. The AIFI (Italian Private Equity, Venture Capital and Private Debt Associa-
tion) provides the definitions for such terms in its website, which are reported below:   
1) Expansion: “financing provided for the growth and expansion of an operating com-
pany, which may or may not be breaking even or trading profitably”; 
2) Replacement: “purchase of existing shares in a company from another private equity 
investment organization or from another shareholder or shareholders”; 
3) Turnaround: “financing made available to existing business, which has experienced 
trading difficulties, in order to re-establishing prosperity”. 
4) Buyout: “Acquisition of a company by a private equity player and the operating (MBO 
– Management Buyout) or an external group of managers (MBI – Management Buyin). 
The financial technique often includes the use of a significant amount of debt”. 
Such categorization and definition is slightly different from the one summarised in Figure 
3. According to PEM® and AIFI, that of private equity and venture capital are two distinct 
Figure 3: Private equity investment stages 
Source: Adapted from Iannotta (2010) 
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activities: the former focuses on the four transactions just described, while the latter fo-
cuses solely on early stage investments. In other terms and with reference to Figure 3, 
PEM® and AIFI consider to be venture capital investments only those made in the early-
stage section. Investments in the expansion-stage, late-stage and buyouts instead are all 
considered within the private equity activities. Moreover, some additional forms of in-
vestments - namely replacement and turnaround, which normally are included in the 
broader category of buyouts - are considered separately. 
Since the analysis made in Chapter 3 and 4 focuses on buyouts (as meant by PEM® and 
AIFI) involving Italian Family Firms, the literature presented in the following sections of 
this work is also focused more on buyouts features rather than on venture capital ones.  
1.2.3 Exit options 
As explained above, the mean through which private equity investments are made is the 
limited partnership, which typically has a lifespan of ten years from its establishment. 
Within this timeframe general partners are expected to exit their positions in the portfolio 
companies in order to return the limited partners’ investments. Therefore, an exit strategy 
is the process through which private equity funds realize the returns on their investments; 
it is one of the key steps of the value generation process and thus one of the most critical 
choice faced by such funds (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2015). 
There are important differences among exit strategies adopted by venture capital funds 
and buyout funds. In the venture capital scenario, investments are typically founded en-
tirely with equity and exit can be achieved through a sale to another private equity fund 
with the aim to further develop the business, through a trade sale to a corporation, or, in 
the case of very successful investments, through an IPO (Initial Public Offering) (Talmor 
and Vasvari, 2011).  
Buyout investments, on the other hand, have a wider spectrum of exit opportunities; the 
reason is that in these cases the initial acquisition is made with the utilisation of large 
amounts of debt, which allows for recapitalization of the investments or dividend out 
proceeds without reducing their equity stake. In brief, according to Talmor and Vasvari 
(2011), six exit strategies could be identified following a buyout: 1) Trade sale; 2) IPO; 
3) Secondary buyouts; 4) Recapitalizations; 5) Share repurchase; 6) Breakups and liqui-
dations. 
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1) Trade sale: the target company is sold to or merged with another company in the private 
or public market. 
2) IPO: the shares of the target company are offered in the public market through a new 
stock issuance.  
3) Secondary buyouts: the portfolio company is sold to another private equity fund. The 
portfolio company’s shares can also be sold via private placements to institutional inves-
tors that are not classified as private equity funds. 
4) Recapitalizations: the private equity firm rises additional debt (and possibly also addi-
tional equity capital) in order to exit only a portion of the current equity stake in the 
portfolio company.  
 5) Share repurchase: the portfolio company’s shares are bought back by the company 
and/or its management from the private equity fund. 
6) Breakups and liquidations: in the case of unsuccessful investments the target compa-
nies are liquidated and sold piecemeal.  
Despite many of the existing researches focus on IPOs, this is not the most common exit 
option adopted by private equity funds. According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), who 
analysed the exit strategies on a sample of buyout transaction in the U.S., the most com-
mon exit option is the sale of the target company to a non-financial (strategic) buyer - this 
occurred in 38% of the cases. While the second most common exit route is the secondary 
buyout, in 24% of the cases. IPO instead - whose popularity seems to be decreasing over 
time - was chosen in 14% of exits. Similar findings for the European market are shown 
by Jenkinson and Sousa (2015). In the analysis of 1022 private equity exits between 2000 
and 2014, they found IPOs to be quite uncommon among private equity funds, with the 
majority of exits represented by trade sales or secondary sales. In particular, in the sample 
analysed around 43% of the exits were secondary sales. However, as previously noticed 
also by Axelson et al. (2013), Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) found evidence that the choice 
between exit options is heavily influenced by the conditions in the debt and equity market. 
In particular, rising equity markets are associated with a preference of IPO over secondary 
sales. Whereas, when debt is cheap and available in great quantities and private equity 
companies have large amount of capital to invest their preference moves towards second-
ary buyouts. 
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1.3 How Private Equity firms improve performance in their targets 
For the private equity industry to function, namely for it to be able to create value through 
the investments on and exit from target companies, certain conditions must be present. 
Normally, the identified target companies must have room for improvements, for exam-
ple, due to an inadequate financial management, the presence of agency costs, the lack of 
focus on value creation or, more in general, the presence of an inadequate ownership or 
management team. It is by acting on improving these aspects that the private equity in-
dustry tries to extrapolate value from its investments.  
Consistently, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) identify some areas of intervention on which 
private equity firms focus on their targets in order to improve their performance: they can 
be categorized as governance, financial and operational value drivers. Interventions on 
these three areas and a literature review of  their impact on target firms are discussed from 
paragraph 1.3.1 to 1.3.3.  
Other studies instead (Castellaneta et al., 2018; Gompers et al., 2015; Hannus, 2015), 
identify additional areas of intervention (or value drivers) on which private equity also 
tend to focus, which are related, in most cases, to corporate culture aspects. These are 
discussed in paragraph 1.3.4. 
1.3.1 Governance value drivers 
Governance refers to how a company is directed and controlled and to how rights and 
responsibilities are distributed among the different corporate bodies and players (Zellwe-
ger, 2017). Therefore, governance engineering concerns all the changes applied to the 
organizational structure of a company (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), such as board com-
position, incentives to management team, and monitoring and control activities. One of 
the pioneers in this field of study is Jensen (1989), who argued that separation of owner-
ship and management generates a wide range of agency problems, such as ineffective 
internal oversight, managerial entrenchment and operational inefficiency. However, re-
cent findings show that private equity firms create value through governance engineering 
not only by increasing ownership concentration, but also by adopting strategic, opera-
tional and incentive changes in board representation (Achleitner et al., 2010), which alto-
gether are linked to a reduction in agency problem related costs (Castellaneta et al., 2018). 
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There are many authors supporting this last point. For instance, Cumming et al. (2007) 
demonstrate that private equity interventions are associated with incentive and govern-
ance mechanisms that contribute to increase performance. Also, Hannus (2015) argued 
that “although the changes brought about in corporate governance rarely directly affect 
the profit drivers, they often have widespread internal effects, which result in performance 
improvements”.  
Moreover, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) noticed that private equity houses care particu-
larly about the management and shareholder’s alignment of interest and the composition 
and activity of the board of directors. Such objectives are pursued with different strate-
gies: in the first place, the alignment of interests is achieved through incentive mecha-
nisms i.e. private equity firms normally require the management team of the target to 
make relevant investment in the equity of the company. Not surprisingly, the results of 
the target and its managers are often linked with stock and option based compensation 
systems; in fact, in the same study, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) show that the average 
CEO gets 5.4% of the equity upside while the management team gets 16%. Coherently, 
Leslie and Oyer (2008) found that managers’ compensations in firms participated by pri-
vate equity funds are lower than the average in their fix components, while higher in the 
variable ones.  
In the second place, to better align the interests of (new) owners and managers the activity 
of private equity firms many times also explicates with the recruitment of additional ex-
ternal managers linked to the private equity house. In this sense, Gompers et al. (2015) 
show that around 50% of private equity investors work with their own senior management 
team involved in the targets after the investments. Additionally, Acharya et al. (2012) 
found evidence that one third of CEO are replaced in the first 100 days of activity of the 
funds and two third at some point over a four-year period.  
Also, private equity investors are generally very concerned about being active members 
of the board of directors of their target firms. Findings by Gompers et al. (2015) suggest 
that the average private equity player is actively involved in all of its deals, and that it 
will take around 3 of the board seats where a board of directors has between 5 to 7 seats 
in 90% of the cases. In addition, private equity participated boards are very active:  they 
normally set up around 12 formal meeting per year and have many more informal contacts 
(Acharya et al., 2012).   
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Continuing, Gadiesh and MacArthur (2008) describe how the active ownership model 
adopted by private equity funds - and partially described above - works in practice. The 
partners identify the following six stages in the model: 1) Define the full potential of the 
firm; 2) Develop the blueprint 100-day plan; 3) Accelerate performance; 4) Harness the 
talent; 5) Make equity sweat; 6) Result-oriented mind-set. More in detail: 
1) Define the full potential: in this stage a due diligence is performed in order to under-
stand what could be the maximum value that could be created in the target company. The 
due diligence will therefore aim at identify strategic opportunities for value creation and 
a potential range of the future value. 
2) Develop the blueprint 100-day plan: one of the key features of private equity funds is 
the ability to identify the activities that create the most value and to obsessively stick to 
them. The funds ‘managers will write down every one of this activity and what has to be 
done differently from day 1. This will let the funds avoid wasting time on low value add-
ing activities and to maximise returns.  
3) Accelerate performance: the private equity firm should implement structural and or-
ganizational changes in the target companies in order to align it with the objectives of the 
blueprint and obtain the desired performance. At the same time such performance must 
be measured with the identification and monitoring of few critical KPIs (Key Perfor-
mance Indicators).  
4) Harness the talent: in order to guide the talent, it is necessary to align the investor’s 
and management’s interests thanks to dedicated rewards mechanisms that encourage 
managers to embrace the activities described in the blueprint. Such rewards mechanisms 
are, for instance, those previously described.  
5) Make equity sweat: this is mainly done with the application of LBO (Leveraged Buy-
outs) economics, which comprehend the usage of high levels of debt as a discipline mech-
anism to reduce the cash flow problem and the extended focus on and management of 
working capital. A more detailed description of this point is presented in the next para-
graph.  
6) Result oriented mind-set: private equity culture is strongly based on a result-oriented 
mind-set. In LBO deals in particular, private equity firms pay great attention to aspects 
such as earnings, margins and cash; they closely monitor performance and continually 
adjust their activity in order to maximize value creation.  
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1.3.2 Financial value drivers 
Moving to the financial level of intervention, the most relevant aspect to consider is the 
large amount of debt normally raised in connection with the buy-out transactions.  
Firstly, debt creates a strong pressure on future cash flows due to interests and principal 
payments. This is seen as a value driver since it reduces the “cash-flow problems” de-
scribed by Jensen (1986), who argued that the management of profitable firms tends to 
dissipate financial resources rather than returning them to shareholders. Particularly in 
companies with positive, stable cash flows and few growth opportunities, the manage-
ment tend to devolve financial resources to investment projects or acquisitions that boost 
growth without creating value. High levels of debt contribute to curb such a behaviour: 
regular payments required by the scheduled interests and principal obligations serve as a 
disciple mechanism and, since in such situations managers are also more exposed to the 
personal cost of bankruptcy, they ensure that the firm keep to perform and run efficiently, 
focusing on value creating activity (Cotter and Peck, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).  
Secondly, high levels of debt in some countries are linked with higher tax deductions i.e. 
a higher tax shield. Not surprisingly, capital structure optimization often aims at minimize 
the after-tax cost of capital by trying to exploit the advantages of interest payments de-
ductibility. Kaplan (2009) consider that it is reasonable to assume that lower taxes due to 
higher interest expenses account for 10 to 20 per cent of the firm value (depending on the 
level of corporate tax rate and level of debt involved). However, despite scholars confirm 
that the tax shield effect creates substantial value for the company, many also consider it 
a source of value capture rather than value creation (Hannus, 2015). The logic behind this 
argument is that any tax advantage is linked to an immediate wealth transfer under a so-
cietal perspective and not to the creation of new value.  
On the other side, though, too high level of leverage (“debt overhang”) can either directly 
limit the growth potential of a company by inhibiting the operational, strategic and gov-
ernmental flexibility of the management or, indirectly, due to strict covenants imposed 
by lenders (Berck and DeMarzo, 2007). In more practical terms, debt overhang translates 
in missed profitable investment opportunities - especially when the NPV (Net Present 
Value) is positive overall but present a negative short-term cash flow effect - and a pro-
gressive erosion of shareholder wealth (Stulz, 1990; Grant, 2011 in Hannus, 2015). How-
ever, as a counter argument, scholars also show that there is no evidence that buyouts are 
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associated with a decrease in investments in innovation (Lerner et al., 2011), which for 
their nature need many years before showing positive cash flows.  
A possible explanation of why high level of debt in private equity targets do not seem to 
represent a particular problem can be twofold. In the first place, private equity houses 
often benefit from both a well-developed network of contacts in the financial industry and 
from a great financial expertise. Studies found that thanks to a broad network of contacts 
among investment banks and other financial players, private equity partners can often 
obtain loans and other debt products at better terms and conditions with respect to indus-
trial buyers (Magowan, 1989; Kaufman and Englander, 1993; in Hannus, 2015).  
In the second place, private equity houses manage debt with a series of financial instru-
ments and techniques generally referred to as financial engineering (Hannus, 2015), 
which allow for a reduction of  “debt overhang” problems in the targets. The latter in-
clude, for instance, the adoption of debt packages that differ both in terms of seniority 
and collateralization, such as “revolving credit facilities”, “Term Loan A”, or “Mezzanine 
debt”, all of which are often used in the private equity industry in order to both reduce 
bankruptcy risk and to better allocate the pressure on cash flows over time. An example 
of the average capital structure and of the instruments used to build it in buyouts can be 
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Following, a description of the main feature of the debt instruments listed in the figure 
above is presented. 
A revolver is a form of senior bank debt that acts like a credit card for companies. It serves 
to fund working capital, capital expenditures, acquisition lines of credit, add-on acquisi-
tions. A company will "draw down" the revolver up to the credit limit when it needs cash, 
and repays the revolver when excess cash is available. 
Senior term debt typically requires full repayment over a 5 to 8-year period. It will contain 
more stringent debt covenants which require the target company to maintain a designated 
credit profile based on financial ratios such as the leverage ratio, interest service coverage 
ratio, and debt service coverage ratio. In addition, the covenants may severely restrict the 
operational flexibility of the company by not allowing, for instance, asset disposition or 
the contraction of additional debt.  
Term Loan A is a debt that must be amortized, normally over 5 to 7 years. 
Term Loan B normally requires a repayment over 5 to 8 years. The peculiarity is that it 
allows the borrower to postpone the payment of largest part of the loan (bullet payment) 
in the last year.  
Figure 4: Capital structure of private equity targets 
Source: International Private Equity (2011) 
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Apart from Term Loan A and Term Loan B other tranches of senior debt with lower 
seniority might be issued.  
Subordinated debt may be raised in the public bond market or the private institutional 
market, carries a bullet repayment with no amortization, and usually has a maturity of 8 
to 10 years. 
High-yield bonds are an additional and more expensive source of financing that may be 
used if senior debt is not enough. Because of the high risk associated with a buyouts 
transaction, such bonds are usually non-investment grade or “junk bonds”. The typical 
term of these bonds is 6 to 10 years (they usually mature after the senior debt). 
Mezzanine debt is typically adjusted to meet the financing needs of the specific buyout.  
As such, its strength is that it allows for great flexibility in structuring terms. It typically 
has embedded warrants attached and provides between 0% and 5% of the total funding 
needed. Interests on mezzanine debt can be paid either through cash or “pay-in-kind” 
toggle. 
The equity capital in an LBO comprises 25% to 50% of the total capital and it provides a 
cushion to lenders and bondholders in the event that the financial condition of the buyout 
target deteriorates. 
1.3.3 Operational value drivers 
Operational value drivers are linked to the operating and industry expertise that private 
equity firms can exploit in order to create value. Interventions on operational value drivers 
are a relatively recent aspect of the private equity activity which, in its first years (1980s), 
mainly relied on financial ones.  
Since the 1990s, many private equity houses started to adopt a strong focus around spe-
cific industries and to collaborate with experts having industry-specific operating back-
grounds. Plus, private equity investors often started to provide the direct expertise of pro-
fessional managers able to improve the deployment of the firm’s existing resources, con-
sequently increasing its competitive advantage. In line with this, Wright et al. (2001) 
highlighted how most of the value in buyouts transactions is created through operational 
improvements. More recently, research on this field also showed that focusing on finan-
cial aspects has not been enough for sustainable value creation in target firms while acting 
on operational levers has consistently allowed private equity funds to achieve positive 
results  (Wright et al., 2006).  
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The effect of private equity on operations has been studied under many aspects. Consid-
ering productivity metrics, Davis et al. (2014) found that private equity backed firms in 
the U.S. (on average) increase the TFP (Total Factor Productivity) by 2,1 log points com-
pared to non-backed peers. The increase is mainly due to the fact that targets do not hes-
itate to close plants that are not productive and to open new ones in the upper part of the 
TFP distribution. In short, private equity funds are able to achieve higher productivity 
metrics thanks to a more appropriate allocation of resources among business units of the 
targets (Davis et al., 2014). Other empiric evidence, for instance, comes from Cumming 
et al. (2007) and Scellato and Ughetto (2013), whose results show how buyouts are asso-
ciated with better resources usage. Also, a study by Alperovych (2013) indicates how 
management buyouts improve efficiency in target firms from 2 years before the transac-
tion (allegedly because of the preparation towards the deal) to 4 years after. Plus, similar 
findings were already highlighted by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), who noticed signif-
icant cost reduction and productivity enhancement in manufacturing firms participated by 
private equity funds. Continuing, Harris et al. (2005) extend the just mentioned study by 
considering a larger sample of management buyouts (979 MBOs in 4877 plants in the 
UK). They find that plants experiencing a MBO are less productive than comparable 
plants before the transfer of ownership but that they experience a substantial increase in 
productivity after the buyout.  
However, at this point it is noteworthy that results on productivity may suffer of signifi-
cant biases. For instance, as Ayash and Schütt (2016) noticed, under current accounting 
rules buyouts targets’ measures are linked to a general upward shift. This is linked, for 
example, to the increase in value of the assets in the balance sheet that naturally occur 
after such deals are completed.  
Another interesting aspect to analyse about operational value drivers regard on what lines 
of the profit and loss account private equity sponsors focus their strategies, namely im-
provements of sales or of operational margins (i.e. EBITDA margins). Ayash, et al. 
(2107) classified these 2 strategies as Classic LBOs, and Entrepreneurial LBOs respec-
tively. In particular, in “Classic LBOs” private equity firms focus more on improving 
bottom-lines operating efficiencies through, for example, the activities described above: 
dismissal of underperforming assets, cut on wasteful investments, etc. On the other hand, 
in “Entrepreneurial LBOs” they focus more on top-line revenue growth and implement 
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the so called “buy and build” strategies, according to which the management concentrate 
more on expansion and acquisition activities. The data shown by the authors support the 
idea that, in modern times, Entrepreneurial LBOs are the most common among the two 
types. However, despite the dichotomy proposed, such strategies seem not to be mutually 
exclusive but rather to be applied simultaneously by private equity firms. For instance, in 
a study on 191 buyouts during the period 1995-2004, Battistin et. al (2017) found that the 
sample of companies analysed was able to obtain higher sales (mainly through the acqui-
sition of other firms), but also (even though in a smaller measure) to achieve higher 
EBITDA margins.  
The last results presented should not be surprising since EBITDA could be considered a 
good proxy of the Operating Free Cash Flow (OFCF). In fact, EBITDA is often referred 
to as “potential operating free cash flow”: this makes it one of the most important finan-
cial measures that is monitored closely by private equity funds. The reason for its im-
portance is twofold: in the first place, private equity firms evaluate every operational 
change and define its priority based on the impact it has on EBITDA. The rationale could 
be found in the fact that improving EBITDA, and eventually cash flows, is necessary to 
pay back the large amount of debt. In the second place, EBITDA is the basis upon which 
debt contractual agreements are negotiated: covenants are set and agreed with the banks 
at the point of transaction and are based on future forecasts of the  financial performance 
submitted at that point, namely EBITDA. As a consequence, private equity firms should 
identify opportunities to also improve EBITDA (rather than focusing on sales only) by 
having leaner and better managed operations. 
Last, the elements that distinguish the EBITDA from the actual operating free cash flow 
available for debt service are the change in the Operating Working Capital (OWC) and 
the Capital Expenditures (CapEx), which, consequently, must be managed meticulously 
by private equity sponsors.  
Operating working capital management refers to all the strategies adopted to manage the 
relationship between short term operating assets and short term operating liabilities. The 
objective is to ensure that a company continues with its operations and meet its obliga-
tions when they fall due and without absorbing to many financial resources, which other-
wise would need to be collected through additional debt. In practice, improving operating 
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working capital means reducing it, since an increase in short term operating assets trans-
lates into a liquidity absorption and vice-versa. Thus, private equity firm will likely try to 
reduce the operating working capital with a series of operating initiatives, namely:   
- Reducing the time to collect receivables; 
- Increasing the time to pay payables; 
- Reducing inventory levels.  
A report by Ernst Young (2020) shows that private equity interventions are able to bring 
benefits in each of these areas. In particular, from an account receivables perspective, 
thanks to billing acceleration, optimized collection processes and dispute management, 
target firms were able to improve the account receivables collection by 5%-6% on aver-
age over a 90-180 day period. From an account payables perspective, the report points 
out how private equity firms concentrate their effort not only on vendor terms (which has 
always been the classic focus) but also on other cost-cutting levers such as supply chain 
financing and e-payment strategies. The adoption of such a holistic approach resulted in 
an improvement of the management of account payables compared to those that focused 
on vendor terms only. Last, as for what concerns the inventory management, the report 
indicates that private equity backed firms adopted strategies that analyse demand or sup-
ply variability lead times, replenishment frequency, and forecast accuracy. In this way, 
on average, such firms were able to reduce their inventory levels by 10% to 30%.  
To conclude, capital expenditures are defined as the funding used by a company to ac-
quire or upgrade physical assets. In order to increase operating free cash flows, they 
should be reduced by private equity firms. Although this is in line with the findings of 
Kaplan (1989), more recent studies show how the private equity activity (in particular 
that concerning private targets) is associated with an increase of capital expenditures. In 
particular, Chung (2011) found that they increased, on average, by 51% in the sample of 
firms studied. The rationale behind such findings, as shown in Battistin et al. (2017),  
could be related to the fact that private equity investors - even though they don’t ignore 
EBITDA improvements - are primarily focusing on top lines growth which normally re-
quire large expenditures in assets. 
1.3.4 Other value drivers 
In a recent work, Castellaneta et al. (2018) identify and summarize several other types of 
value drivers from the existing literature – among which strategic, cultural, commercial 
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and institutional - and a broader list of related sub-drivers that private equity firms nor-
mally exploit in order to create value. Of particular interest for this work are the cultural 
driver and some of the related sub-drivers, namely the role of monitoring and mentoring 
and of the revived entrepreneurial spirit.  
First, with reference to the parenting advantage framework proposed by Campbell et al. 
(1995), it seems that private equity funds thrive in developing monitoring, mentoring and 
learning services which allow them to build distinctive organizational capabilities 
(Hannus, 2015). Not surprisingly, a key role for the achievement of such results is played 
by the cultural shift towards a less bureaucratic form of organization and the adoption of 
an active ownership model (as anticipated in 1.3.1).  In fact, such model allows for the 
instalment of direct communication channels among ownership and management which 
translate into an incentive for constructive interactions (Kester and Luehrman, 1995). In 
line with this, researches show that private equity investors frequently (meaning on a 
weekly or even daily basis) discuss issues and opportunities directly with the top man-
agement, contrary to what happens in the traditional corporate boards. For instance, a 
study by Heel and Kehoe (2005) illustrates how in the private equity buyouts analysed 
“the partners spent more than half of their time on the company during the first 100 days 
and met almost daily with top executives”. 
Second, private equity transactions are commonly seen as a vehicle to reinstall an entre-
preneurial spirit in target companies, which is unsurprisingly associated with overall per-
formance improvements (Wright et al., 1996). To this extend, private equity backed firms 
are normally linked to enhanced R&D activities, business and product development, and 
technological alliances (Lerner et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 1992; Zahra and Fescina, 
1991). Another aspect that can be linked to the cultural change and the enhanced entre-
preneurship is the positive influence that these operations have on human resources man-
agement. For instance, Bruining et al. (2004) in the sample of target firms analysed found 
evidence of increased training, employee involvement, number of employees, and pay 
levels. 
Last, Gomper et al. (2015), having studied 79 private equity firms with more than 750$ 
billions of assets under management, found that the sources of value added are: increasing 
revenue, improving incentives and governance, facilitating a high value exit or sale, mak-
ing additional acquisitions, replacing management and reducing costs. In short, however, 
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even though there are many other researches in which scholars identified and classified 
many different activities and areas of intervention of the Private Equity firms, they are all 
substantially similar and can be somehow included in the macro areas proposed within 
the last three paragraphs.  
Summarising, from paragraph 1.3.1 to 1.3.4 we presented a theoretical framework con-
cerning the major area of intervention of private equity sponsors. The existing literature 
recognizes that value creation in investee companies is mostly linked to strategic changes 
in their governance, financial and operating structure (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), as 
well as to improvements of other aspects related to corporate culture, like enhanced en-
trepreneurial spirit, human resources training and communication among company layers 
(e.g. Bruining et al., 2004; Heel and Kehoe, 2005; Wright et al., 1996). In the next section, 
we will analyse how private equity-backed companies have been performing over the 
years, providing additional evidence of the overall effects of the above mentioned 
interventions.  
1.4 Portfolio companies’ performance 
Extensive research has been carried out to examine the performance of private equity-
backed firms (e.g Bacon et al., 2012; Kaplan, 1989; Guo et al., 2011; Opler, 1992; Scel-
lato and Ughetto, 2013; Wilson et al., 2012; Smith, 1990). Scholars have been focusing 
on many accounting measures in order to assess the impact of these investments - through 
the value drivers described above - on targets. They include, for instance, sales and em-
ployment growth (Bacon et al., 2012), cash flow (Kaplan, 1989), profitability, size and 
productivity (Guo et al., 2011; Scellato and Ughetto, 2013) and many others, part of 
which have already been mentioned in paragraph 1.3.1 to 1.3.4.  
Considering the first buyout wave of the 1980s, the evidence (mostly from the U.S.) 
shows that portfolio companies were able to increase profitability, growth and liquidity 
after buyouts. Specifically, Kaplan (1989) provide evidence of a net increase in net in-
come and cash-flow together with a decrease of capital expenditures in 76 U.S. buyouts. 
The results are confirmed by Opler (1992),  who noticed a 11,6% increase in operating 
cash flow in a sample of 44 buyouts carried out in the late 1980s. Also Smith (1990), who 
investigated changes in operating performance after 58 buyouts from 1977 to 1986, show 
that operating cash flows increased significantly from the year before to the year after 
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buyouts. Similar results were found in Europe, where Wright et al. (1992) discovered 
significant improvements in profitability in U.K. buyouts.  
Moving to more recent studies i.e. studies of the second and third buyout waves of private 
equity transactions, some authors argue that private equity investments lead to substan-
tially positive impact on firm performance (Goossens et al., 2008). However, results for 
this wave show some contradictions. In particular, Scellato and Ughetto (2013) studied a 
sample of 241 European companies in the period between 1997 and 2004 and found am-
biguous results. On the one hand, they noticed a significant increase in total assets in 
target firms. On the other hand, though, operating profitability for portfolio companies 
were lower compared to the control group i.e. non-target, comparable firms. On the con-
trary, Guo et al. (2011), examining buyouts completed between 1990 and 2006, find that 
“gains in operating performance are either comparable to or slightly exceed those ob-
served for benchmark firms”. Coherently, positive impacts on targets are confirmed in 
the following years by findings presented by Wilson et al., (2012), who examined the 
performance of thousands of private equity transactions in the UK during the years of the 
last global recession. Indeed, their empirical evidence shows that private equity-backed 
firms were able to outperform comparable peers that did not experience such transaction. 
In detail, the analysis highlighted a positive differential in profitability for portfolio com-
panies of around 3% to 5% compared to non-targets.  
Moreover, considering the Italian scenario, a recent study by Pwc (2020), estimated that 
private equity firms had a direct impact on the performance of the companies they own, 
resulting in net growth differences compared to companies not owned by private equity: 
from 2014 to 2018 the growth in revenues of portfolio companies is significantly higher 
than the growth of the related benchmark (5.5% against 1.3% in 2018, with a positive 
difference always above 4% over the entire period) . The average employment growth 
rate for private equity backed companies is also higher than the average employment 
growth rate of  Italian companies: firms in which private equity had a stake had a rate of 
employment growth steadily close to 5% over the 4 years, compared to the 0.0% rate of 
Italian businesses.  
Concluding, despite some contrasting evidence exists, it seems that, in the majority of 
buyouts from the 1980s to more recent years, target firms were positively impacted by 
private equity funds under different point of views.  
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1.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a relevant theoretical framework useful to understand the structures and 
the mechanisms behind the private equity industry was presented. Also, a review of the 
current literature about how private equity firms create value in target companies, along  
with an analysis of the evidence on private equity-backed firms’ results in the years post-
deal, was performed.  
Overall, the private equity industry shows some peculiar features, namely the willingness 
to raise investment funds with the aim of taking an ownership interest in a company and 
holding it on private hands; the desire to make positive, lasting changes in the businesses 
they own; the need to exit the investments at the right time in order to provide investors 
with a fair return. 
The major distinction made within the industry is between venture capital investments 
and buyouts. The former generally indicates private equity investments aimed at the de-
velopment of new ideas or businesses in their start-up phase, while the latter broadly re-
fers to investments in later stages of the business cycles. In buyouts, private equity firms 
try to influence the businesses they acquire in a relatively short period of time (normally 
3 to 5 years) with rapid and deep interventions on their financial, governance, operating 
and cultural dimensions. In practice, private equity sponsors create value through in-
creased levels of debt, which prevent management to dissipate available financial re-
sources while reducing agency conflicts between managers and owners; through the ap-
plication of specific governance mechanisms aimed at accelerating decision-making pro-
cesses, aligning the interests of the different stakeholders, and assuring better monitoring 
and controlling activities; through the improvement of operating activities, with the pur-
pose of reducing operating working capital, increase margins and boost growth; and last, 
through interventions on cultural aspects, such as reviving the entrepreneurial spirit, im-
proving communication among business layers, and providing mentoring and learning 
services. 
Data on post buyouts performance show that, on average, such deals have a positive im-
pact on investee companies. Indeed, despite some contradictory evidence, especially with 
regard to operating efficiency, buyouts are generally associated with an increase in sales, 
operating cash flows and profitability.  
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A thorough understanding of the main dynamics within which the private equity industry 
moves, together with a detailed comprehension of the value levers exploited by private 
equity mangers and the results they achieved in portfolio firms, are some prerequisites of 
paramount importance in order to better understand the analysis that will follow.  
 In Chapter 2 we will continue by contextualizing the private equity activity into the world 
of family businesses, where some of the underlying logics and values might seem in deep 
contrast with those discussed so far. In particular, we will explain in detail what are the 
factors that might tie together these economic realities and what are those that might keep 
them apart. Also, we will show a literature review on how private equity-backed family 




PRIVATE EQUITY AND FAMILY FIRMS 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, we have seen some of the major trends of the private equity industry,  what 
are the structures and the logics under which it operates, as well as the results it has 
achieve on portfolio companies. The picture emerged about private equity firms is clearly 
that of highly professional organizations, strictly adhering to the maximization of value 
creation and the adoption of enhanced management and financial practices. In short, it 
can be stated that private equity sponsors are profit-focused investors that aim at invest-
ing, and subsequently divesting, their equity stakes with maximum capital gains in a lim-
ited period of time (Dawson, 2011; Wright and Robbie, 1998) of typically four to seven 
years (Upton and Petty, 2000). In this chapter, on the one hand we will try to understand 
how compatible such a modus operandi is with that of family, while, on the other hand, 
what have been the outcomes (in terms of performance) of family firms’ buyouts in past 
and recent years. 
The interests of the analysis is (at least) twofold. In the first place, family businesses 
represent the vast majority of economic organizations throughout the world, especially in 
the private economy, and thus a great opportunity for private equity investors (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2003; Dawson, 2011; Zellweger, 2017). In the second 
place, family firms often adhere to contrasting logics as compared to those mentioned 
above. Generally, they care particularly about non-financial goals (Gómez-Mejia et al., 
2007), and are not very prone to open up their capital to family outsiders (Poutziouris, 
2001), thus resulting difficult and complicated targets for private equity sponsors.  
Do private Equity Investments improve financial performance in Family Firms? Evidence from Italy. 
32 
Consequently, in order to better comprehend the relationship between the two actors, we 
will start by discussing what exactly is meant by family firms (section 2.2), overcoming 
common misconceptions related to them. Following, paragraph 2.2.1 will provide an ex-
planation of the main traits, characteristics and players involved in a family business. 
Paragraph 2.2.2 delves deeper into the analysis, adjusting the focus on the most important 
aspects of family firms’ financial practices and explaining how they are affected by the 
underlying logics previously discussed. From section 2.3, private equity and family firms 
are finally examined together: first, by providing a recap of their main features (hence 
highlighting points of convergence and divergence); then, by explaining family firms’ 
perspective on private equity (2.3.1), private equity’s perspective on family firms (2.3.2), 
and last, some data on the actual number of family business buyouts (2.3.3). To conclude, 
as in the case of Chapter 1, section 2.4 reports a literature review on the post-deal perfor-
mance achieved by private equity-backed family firms.  
2.2 Family Firms 
Family Firms are one of the first forms of commercial organization. One hundred years 
ago “business” meant “family business” and thus the adjective “family” was redundant,  
as Aldrich and Cliff (2003) wrote. Today, their classification and consideration are often 
subject of misinterpretation, with many considering a family firm just as the bakery or 
the grocery store in their neighbourhood. However, the reality is different: according to a 
study by McKinsey (2010), one-third of all companies in the S&P 500 index are defined 
as family businesses and they do not merely consist of the small and mid-sized companies 
but also of giants such as BMW, Samsung and Wal-Mart. Coherently, family firms re-
search is becoming an ever more important and accepted field of study in business eco-
nomics, as can be inferred from the increasing number of published journals, special is-
sues, and conferences on this particular topic (Harms, 2014).  
In order to gain a clear picture of this particular type of ownership, scholars have proposed 
many definitions of what a family business is. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
define a family firm as a firm in which the family maintains a significant ownership stake 
and/or managerial control. Zellweger (2017) instead, expands this view defining a family 
firm as a firm dominantly controlled by a family with the vision to potentially sustain 
family control across generations. However, a precise, generally-accepted categorization 
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of family and non-family businesses across countries is still lacking. Table 1 below shows 
how a neat demarcation between the two phenomena does not exist: 
 
In spite of the many definitions used to describe them and the lack of a definitive one, 
many consider family firms to be the dominant form of economic enterprise throughout 
the world (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), with estimation suggesting that they account ap-
proximately for 40% to 70% of global employment and GDP (Zellweger, 2017). In Eu-
rope in particular, family businesses are the single biggest source of employment in the 
private sector, which consists of more than 14 million family businesses providing over 
60 million jobs (KPMG, 2015). The European Commission, which defines a private fam-
ily business as: 
«A firm, of any size, […] if: 1) The majority of decision-making rights is in 
the possession of the natural person(s) who established the firm, or in the 
possession of the natural person(s) who has/have acquired the share capital 
of the firm, or in the possession of their spouses, parents, child or children’s 
direct heirs. 2) The majority of decision-making rights are indirect or direct. 
3) At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in 
the governance of the firm» (European Commision, n.d. b) 
Table 1: Family business definitions 
Source: Adapted from Zellweger (2017) 
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and adds the following point for the case of publicly listed firms: 
«4) Listed companies meet the definition of family enterprise if the person 
who established or acquired the firm (share capital) or their families or de-
scendants possess 25 per cent of the decision-making rights mandated by 
their share capital» (European Commission, n.d. c) 
states that 70% to 90% of all firms in the European Union are family firms. For what 
concerns the Italian scenario, according to the classification and the study made by Flören 
et al., (2010), Italy’s share of family firms is even higher, reaching 93%.  
2.2.1 Business logics in Family Firms  
Zellweger (2017) argues that “practitioners and scholars alike have found it useful to de-
fine family firms as organizations characterized by the interplay of several subsystems”. 
In detail, two most basic subsystems can be identified in the family and in the firm and 
each of them is presumed to adhere to different - if not opposing - logics. The family 
subsystem is thought to be characterized by tradition, emotional/irrational behaviour, nep-
otism, long term perspective and non-financial values, while the logic characterizing the 
firm is generally constituted by renewal, rational behaviour, meritocracy, short term per-
spective and financial values. In line with the literature, KPMG (2015) describes a num-
ber of traits that define family businesses (particularly those in the first or second gener-
ation, where the founder influence is still strong) and distinguishes them from non-family 
corporations. These traits consist of “a casual approach to business processes and proce-
dures, more personal management, less defined business strategies and plans, and a do-it 
yourself attitude”. Again according to KPMG (2015), only when the family firm has a 
desire to grow would the logic of the firm increase its importance: this translates into 
improvement of the governance structure, education of the family and external-talents 
acquisition. Nevertheless, in order to avoid jumping to conclusions, it is important to keep 
in mind that while such simplification of the reality into circle models and stereotypes is 
useful to disentangling the underlying logic of the subsystems, it can also lead to flawed 
subsystems prototypes and functionality assumptions. For instance, as Zellweger (2017) 
points out, “relationships among family members may be more complex than those 
among non-family members, but they are not necessarily less rational” and, despite it 
normally seems that the family sphere negatively affects the success of the business, 
“many aspects of the family logic may be present and even desirable in the business”.  
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A more complete and much more used alternative to the two circle model proposed by 
Zellweger is the three circle model (Figure 4) introduced by Tagiuri and Davis (1996). In 
this case, a family business is represented as the interconnection of three elements: the 
family, the ownership and the management, all of which might overlap with one another 
in one or more points, defining in this way seven roles that a person could have in the 
firm. Hence, its main contribution is to highlight the role-related complexities that actors 
involved in family-firm environments experience. 
The overview presented so far is to say that family businesses require a kind of manage-
ment that is only apparently and superficially similar to that others nonfamily businesses. 
Running a family firm is always a difficult task and often asks to find compromises be-
tween stakeholders (i.e. actors of the various subsystems) that are strongly attached to the 
firm’s assets not only under a financial point of view, but also under an emotional one. 
More on this point will be discussed in the remaining part of the chapter.  
Figure 5: Three-circle model of family influence 
Source: Tagiuri and Davis (1996) 
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2.2.2 Financial practices in Family Firms 
It might seem reasonable to believe that family firms adopt the same principles of corpo-
rate finance of any other firm since, after all, they are firms themselves. However, the 
influence of the family over financing decisions leads to decision making criteria based 
on assumptions that are not always in line with the fundamental ones of corporate finance 
e.g. selection of financial sources according to cost minimization (Myers, 1984) or the 
balancing of the capital structure with an optimization of the tax benefits and the cost of 
debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Indeed, family firms are likely to engage in a finan-
cial logic based not only on rational economic motivation but also on personal preferences 
for growth, risk, and ownership control (Gallo et al., 2004). Interesting arguments of why 
family firms do not homologate with the standard principles of finance are proposed by 
Zellweger (2017) who, starting from the well-known CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing 
Model), suggests that some of the pillars at its basis should be re-considered  in the con-
text of family businesses. In particular, he suggests that there are mainly three important 
considerations to analyse more in depth, given the fact that some other assumptions of 
the CAPM, such as the absence of taxes and commission or the inability of investors to 
influence prices, can be taken as valid also in this context.  
First of all, the assumption of investors having a well-diversified portfolio of assets with 
a passive and minority stake in each of them is in deep contrast with the reality of family 
firm, where owners normally have a concentrated and active wealth position. As a con-
sequence, family firms should be relatively more risk adverse compared to a standard 
investor and their owners should be considered as “risk shaper” rather than “risk taker” 
(Zellweger, 2017). Coherently, in the words of Anderson and Reeb (2003), the founding 
families see their businesses as a “good” to be passed on to family members and its de-
scendants rather than an asset to be exploited (as it normally is the case for minority 
shareholders). In this perspective, the survival of the company becomes a matter of para-
mount importance for family business owners, which will seek risk reduction strategies 
through, for example, the adoption of forms of capital associated with low default risk. 
Scholars seem to agree on this point, arguing that family firms normally employ con-
servative financial instruments and that the trans-generational passage influences financ-
ing decisions in this sense (Amore et al., 2011; Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar, 2007; 
McConaughy and Phillips, 1999; Molly et al., 2010 in Koropp et al., 2014). Consistently, 
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other studies show a strong preference of family businesses for internal financing and 
family funds over debt instruments (Romano et al., 2001; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). How-
ever, there is not clear evidence that family firms present lower levels of debt as compared 
to nonfamily counterparts (Wu et al., 2007), confirming that capital structure setting in 
family business mostly depends on the personal preferences and attitudes of the owner-
managers (Koropp et al., 2014). 
Second, Zellweger (2017) highlights the fact that family business owners are not overly 
concerned about short-term results and are generally more focused on the long-term ones. 
This is in clear contradiction with the CAPM, which assumes that investors do not care 
about the time horizon of their investments. In addition, the fact that family business 
owners invest over an extended time horizon and do not seek for immediate returns pro-
vides them with a competitive advantage. Such argument is related to the concept of 
“familiness” proposed by Habberson and Williams (1999): according to the authors, 
familiness derives from the integration of the family and the business and contributes to 
develop a sustainable competitive advantage that, in this case, generates from a particular 
type of capital that they refer to as “family capital”. Family capital, indeed, has the prop-
erty of being unique to the family that generated it and - as noticed also by Zellweger 
(2017) - is normally considered to be patient i.e. invested in the firm for long periods of 
time. This characteristic allows family businesses to pursue investing opportunities that 
might be more profitable in the long run compared to those chosen by competitors focus-
ing on the short-term (Zellweger, 2017).   
Third, family business owners are often known for pursuing non-financial objectives over 
financial ones (see e.g. Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007). Indeed, in running their firms, families 
do not only consider business related goals, but pursue also other objectives like the 
preservation of control over generations, the nurturing of benevolent social ties (i.e. the 
relationships with individuals inside as well as outside the families), the status and repu-
tation of both the firm and the family, etc. Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007 analyse in detail 
these aspects and define them as part of the Socio Emotional Wealth (SEW). A precise 
definition of SEW is presented in paragraph 2.3.1, where it is also contextualised in the 
relationship between family businesses and private equity investors. For now, this is to 
highlight the neat contrast with the CAPM, which assumes that investors always want to 
maximize their economic utility. Notably, Zellweger (2017) argues that when “caught in 
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a dilemma over which utility dimension to prioritize, decision makers must carefully con-
sider the firm’s vulnerability”. This generally leads family firms to weight more non-
financial goals - even at the expense of SEW -  but only when the actual financial perfor-
mance does not need improvements and vice-versa. In other words, decisions that are 
counterproductive under an economic perspective are abandoned in time of financial dis-
tress. There is ample evidence supporting this thesis: for instance, (Koropp et al., 2014) 
noticed that family owned olive mills in Spain are more likely to join coops as the volume 
of sales decline. Similarly, newspapers are more likely to terminate family directors when 
the probability of failure is high (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2003). 
In sum, Table 2 below illustrates the main differences between CAPM’s assumptions – 
associated with financial “standard” practices - and the family firms’ logics.  
 
Concluding, the peculiarity of family firms’ equity that have been presented above and 
summarized in Table 2, together with other specific traits showed in previous paragraphs, 
neatly distinguishes investments in this asset class from “standard” investments in public 
Table 2: CAPM's assumptions and family firms 
Source: Adapted from Zellweger (2017) 
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and private equity i.e. equity investments strictly adhering to CAPM or other strict eco-
nomic logics. Such difference, focusing on a comparison with private equity investments, 
will be covered more in detail in the next sections.  
2.3 Family equity and private equity 
Having discussed the main feature of family firms and private equity firms, important 
differences clearly started to emerge between the two. With particular regard to the equity 
in the family firm or “family equity” as Zellweger (2017) calls it, a list of the main char-
acteristics differentiating it from the private equity (intended as equity stakes owned by 
private equity funds) is presented in Table 3 below. The table clearly collects and sum-
marises the most important features of the two economic actors, integrating Table 2 on 
the one hand, while highlighting how their equities are doubtlessly distinct asset classes 
on the other (Zellwrger, 2017).  The points of contact and the divergencies exposed here 
ought to be kept in mind as they lie at the basis of a thorough comprehension of the dis-
cussion that follows.   
2.3.1 Family firms’ perspective on private equity funds 
According to the existing literature, a family firm might need financing from a private 
equity fund either for family or business related reasons. In order to understand what these 
Table 3: Private versus family equity 
Source: Adapted from Zellweger (2017) 
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reasons are, scholars have conducted research with primary focus on the following theo-
ries: theory of planned behaviour, stewardship, SEW, pecking order theory, agency the-
ory and research based view. Such research, other than the motives for family firms to 
engage with private equity houses, highlights also some of the aspects that might impede 
or complicate the relationship between the two actors. These last aspects are the starting 
point of this paragraph, which then ends by presenting the main arguments in favour of 
private equity.  
To begin with, as anticipated in section 2.2.2, family firms tend to be reluctant to open up 
their capital to external investors. Many studies found that, in order to safeguard family 
ownership, control, and financial independence from outsiders, owners-managers of fam-
ily firms often overlook growth opportunities that might become available thanks to third-
party financing (Upton and Petty, 2000; Poutziouris, 2001). Notably, such fear of loss of 
control and managerial freedom (mainly due to the replacement of existing family man-
agers with external professionals, who often are not considered as “stewards” of the firm, 
after the transaction)  depends on the equity stake acquired by the private equity fund and 
is normally associated with majority investments (e.g. buyouts). Coherently, Tappeiner 
et al. (2012) found that in the case of minority investments (less than 50%) family owners 
often keep an active role in guiding the company, while the same role becomes quite 
marginal for family members in the case of majority investments.  
Another stream of research, tightly connected with the one just presented, states that rea-
sons for family firms not to rely on private equity capital are related to the family loss-
aversion regarding Socio Emotional Wealth (SEW). As observed by Gómez-Mejia et al. 
(2007), who define SEW as “the total stock of affect that the family has vested in the 
firm”, family firms base their decisions on a mix of financial and non-financial criteria, 
where the latter are at the mercy of the former only when the survival of the business is 
at risk. Such logic is clearly in contrast with the one adopted by private equity firms, 
which always strictly operate following financial and value-creation objectives: this cre-
ates a sympathy gap between the two players (Seet et al., 2010) that might prevent a 
positive interaction between them.  
Additionally on the reluctance of family businesses towards private equity, many studies 
on capital structure have concluded that requests for additional sources of finance seems 
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to follow a pecking order. According to the pecking order hypothesis (POH), firms fi-
nance their operations first with internally generated funds, second with debt and third 
with external equity (Myers, 1984). Both Poutziouris (2001) and López-Gracia and 
Sánchez-Andújar (2007) confirm that, mainly to reduce outsiders’ influence and (again) 
to retain control over the family business, closely held family firms strongly adhere to 
this hierarchy when developing their financial structure. Hence, when a private family 
firm is in need of additional sources of capital and lacks the internal generated funds or 
is unable to raise additional debt, private equity is considered only as the last resort 
(Tappeiner et al., 2012).  
A last consideration found in the literature supporting the apparent distance among family 
firms and private equity is about the time horizon of the investment. As observed by Al-
cheitner et al., 2008, family firms tend to have a long term investment orientation and a 
focus on preserving the firm (see also paragraph 2.2.2), while private equity funds focus 
on shareholders’ value maximization in the short-medium run and are willing to take 
higher risks.  
Moving to what is in contrast with the arguments stated so far, there are circumstances 
under which family firms prefer additional equity rather than debt and therefore private 
equity funds are not necessarily seen as a last resort. For instance, equity is preferred over 
debt to finance growth projects since, by contract, debt has to be reimbursed inde-
pendently of the projects’ success while equity has not. This view is backed by empirical 
researches made by Achleitner et al. (2008) and Tappeiner et al. (2012), which show that 
additional equity from external investors is often required to face challenges related to 
growth, such as internationalisations or acquisitions of other firms. The above mentioned 
researchers also show that external equity is often a choice when family firms are facing 
crises like liquidity shortages or family related issues that lead, for example, to buying 
out a family shareholder. More in general, since the lack of financial resources is one of 
the principal factors affecting the development, growth opportunities, and long-term sur-
vival of private family firms (Romano et al., 2001; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003), opening up 
the equity capital to external investors (like private equity funds) is often a reasonable 
solution to these problems. Such views confirm the point made by Gallo et. al (2004) and 
Koropp et al. (2014), according to which family firms financing preferences are mostly 
individual (see section 2.2.2).  
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In favour of  the engagement between family firms and private equity investors are also 
the non-financial benefits that these funds bring to family firms. As observed by 
Tappeiner et al., 2012, the more the family needs the investor’s resources, in particular 
non-financial ones, the higher is the probability of the owner to concede private equity 
funds more voting rights (notably, this also perfectly fits with the SEW theory, since SEW 
losses associated with lower level of control in this case are compensated by obtaining 
the needed resources). Indeed, such benefits might be of paramount importance for solv-
ing some of the most common weaknesses found in the context of family businesses, for 
instance: 
1) Lack of professionalization in operational and strategic issues;  
2) low presence of talented managers; 
3) declining entrepreneurial orientation; 
4) succession challenges.  
First, as seen in Chapter 1, the sets of changes brought by private equity firms to their 
targets are not only applied at a financial level but also at an operational one and to the 
investee’s governance structure. Plus, the value drivers that can be managed are many 
and, in most cases, also specifically thought to address weakness 1) to 4), as explained in 
details in section 1.3. More specific to the family business environment instead, is the 
point about succession challenges.  
The problem of succession in family firms has been broadly investigated and many schol-
ars have come to the conclusion that intra-family transfer of ownership and management 
is by far the preferred option. In fact, many families strive to keep ownership control 
within its members over several generations (Chua et al., 1999). However, other research 
indicates that most family firms fail to cope with succession and only a small percentage 
of family owned businesses survive across generations, with a mere 30% surviving past 
the first generation and only 10% to 15% making it to the third generation (Miller et al., 
2003). The literature also indicates many possible reasons for succession failure, includ-
ing insufficient succession planning, incompetent, unprepared or unwilling heirs, low 
quality of the relationships within family members, and financial issues (e.g. Koropp et 
al., 2013). In addition, succession is naturally a one time-event in the perspective of most 
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business owners. Therefore, the experience and resources (both financial and non-finan-
cial) of private equity firms might help family owned businesses in structuring and suc-
ceed in the succession process (Koropp et al., 2013).  
Summarising, the perspective of family firms on private equity financing has been studied 
under many research theories, with a main focus on theory of planned behaviour, stew-
ardship, SEW, pecking order theory, agency theory and research based view. Findings 
show that a family firm might tend to avoid opening its capital to third-party financing 
(especially equity financing), or to consider it only as a last resort option. This happens 
mainly because of the fear of loss of control over the firm’s assets and of freedom over 
their management. However, some evidence that under certain circumstances - like the 
need of additional financial resources for growth projects or succession issues - family 
firms rely on the means and expertise of external investors like private equity funds, does 
not lack.  
2.3.2 Private equity funds’ perspective on family firms 
Looking at family firms from the perspective of private equity funds, as it was for the 
opposite case, some points of affinity and some of aversion arise.  
To begin with, scholars argue that private equity funds are interested in family firms 
mainly for three reasons: first, they represent a large deal pool; second, they have potential 
for high financial returns; third, they have unique human capital. These reasons, together 
with the related counter arguments found in the literature, are presented more in detail 
below. 
In the first place - as also explained in section 2.2 - data show that family firms represent 
a very common form of economic organization throughout the world and thus a large deal 
pool for financial investors like private equity firms (Dawson, 2011). This is particularly 
true in Italy, where the family firms have a decisive weight in the national economy.  
Second, thanks to their common features, family businesses are often perceived as very 
attractive investment opportunities. There are two main reasons for such attractiveness: 
on the one hand, many family-owned firms are unable to access both the resources and 
capabilities needed to sustain competitive advantage and growth, which private equity 
investors can provide (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Clearly, this point is related to the family 
firms’ weaknesses presented in 2.3.1 and is generally solved with the strategic interven-
tions already discussed.  
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On the other hand, many family-owned businesses tend to focus more on bottom line 
activities rather than on top ones (i.e. they focus more on sales and production at the 
expense of strategic planning), remaining “economically underdeveloped” (Dreux, 1990). 
In addition, some private equity investors describe family businesses as less efficient, less 
professional, and less successful as compared to other organizations (Granata and Chi-
rico, 2010). As a consequence, in such businesses there might be room for unlocking a 
greater potential compared to non-family firms, and consequently for gaining greater fi-
nancial returns (Schickinger et al., 2018). However, it is important to consider that, as 
Dreux (1990) and Dawson (2006) showed, private equity investors are more likely to 
target family firms that have attractive economics and already display positive overall 
performance before the deal, while they tend to avoid uncertain situations where the in-
vestment activity is naturally associated with more risk. Thus, arguing that family firms 
are able to generate greater financial returns for private equity might be pretentious with-
out adding further specifications. A possible way for disentangling the discussion is to 
differentiate between minority and majority investments, which in most cases can also be 
considered as a proxy for distinguishing the investment stage (expansion versus later 
stage operations), as specified in Chapter 1. 
On the one hand, minority investments might lead to greater synergies and performance 
achievement in family firms, especially when the actual human capital of their boards is 
not substituted, and a monitoring and supporting role is assigned to the private equity’s 
representatives. Indeed, such configuration allow for the creation of a superior govern-
ance able to reduce agency costs while integrating private equity investors and incumbent 
owners’ strategic resources (Battistin et al., 2017). Against this last consideration, how-
ever, many scholars argue that minority investments might lead to less attractive scenar-
ios. This is due to the fact that family members’s desire to pursue non-financial goals at 
the expense of the business performance could negatively affect the minority stake of 
non-family shareholders (Berrone et al., 2012). Also, the presence of a business-owning 
family with majority voting rights is seen as an obstacle to any plan for an initial public 
offering (IPO) as a possible exit strategy, thus reducing the family firm's attractiveness 
(Schickinger et al., 2018). Moreover, the partial sale of a company normally increases the 
number of owners, augmenting possible disagreement between them and creating so 
called owner-owner conflicts (Chrisman et al., 2012) 
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On the other hand, majority investments seem to allow the private equity firm to better 
implement structural changes at strategic and operational levels, hence facilitating the 
harvest of unexploited growth potential (Reid, 1996). However, also in this case contra-
dictory evidence exists: in the sample of Italian deals studied by Battistin et al. (2017), 
private equity funds seem able to foster growth in family firms only when they acquire a 
minority stake.  
Moving forward, a last aspect worthy of interest when analysing family firms with the 
perspective of private equity investors is the peculiar human capital provided by the fam-
ily. In fact, in family firms, family managers and owners are likely to develop capabilities 
and relations that give firms competitive advantages through an in-depth understanding 
and connection with their business environment. Private equity investors are interested in 
accessing this tacit knowledge and network of relationships in order to exploit the benefits 
coming from them (Dawson, 2006). Also, Dreux (1990) noticed that private equity funds 
favourably see other characteristics of the family’ human capital, such as the loyalty and 
long-term commitment. However, given the fact that family members may work in the 
firm without proven merits (nepotism) (see e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Zellweger, 
2017), funds normally want to assess the quality of family human resources prior to taking 
investing decisions. Not surprisingly, private equity funds' likelihood of investing in a 
family firm is positively associated with the presence of structured entry programs which 
foresee, for example, that family members gain outside work experience before entering 
the company (Dawson, 2006). Additionally, the likelihood of investing in a family firm 
is also positively correlated with the presence of professional (non-family) managers in 
leading positions. Indeed, external managers bring heterogeneity and healthy conflicts to 
the firm by providing perspectives that are not deriving from family experience. Moreo-
ver, they are less emotionally connected to the business, making delicate decisions less 
difficult (Dawson, 2006; 2011). 
Summarising, there are different aspects of family firms that are more or less interesting 
in the eyes of private equity investors. The main focus of the existing research is centred 
on different theories, such as agency theory e.g. in the case of owner-owner conflicts, or 
the resource based view e.g. in the case of the unique human capital of family firms and 
- despite the evidence proposed at this level of analysis is not unidirectional - it seems 
that private equity investors see family firms more in a favourable way than not.  
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2.3.3 What do data on transactions say? 
The discussion developed so far on private equity and family firms, despite some contra-
dictory evidence, seems to be more balanced towards the existence of a positive and mu-
tually beneficial interaction between the two players. European market data on the num-
ber of family businesses involved in private equity transactions, if considered as an indi-
cator of the “reciprocal feeling”, clearly support this thesis. In particular they show that 
family firms have been some of the main targets of private equity funds, especially in 
some countries like the UK, Italy and France (CMBOR, 2005). Other observations by the 
Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR, 2008) instead, showed that the an-
nual number of management buyouts/ins rose from 1.212 in 1998 to 1.436 by the end of 
2007, with buyouts of family firms representing some of the most common ones. Also, 
the number of deals in this particular segment increased from 451 in 1998 to 559 in 2007 
and the aggregated value from €11.2 billion to €18.3 billion over the same period. Plus, 
the majority of buyouts of family firms is backed by a financial sponsor, with data show-
ing that 62% of all buyouts of family firms in that period was backed by private equity 
firms (Scholes et al., 2009).  Considering the Italian landscape only and more recent years 
(as also exhaustively showed in Chapter 3), the number of private equity deals involving 
eamily firms accounted for 78% of the total ones registered in 2018, with an increase of 
11% compared to the previous year (PEM® Report, 2018) 
2.4 Private Equity-backed family firms’ performance 
Moving forward, in order to have a complete comprehension of the phenomenon it is 
important to further investigate the relation between private and family equity in terms of 
its impact on firms’ performance.  
In general, as described in Chapter 1, private equity activities seem to be associated with 
a positive impact in their target firms under many aspects. With regard to family firms, 
recent research does not seem to be balanced towards the same conclusion, except under 
some particular circumstances. However, the matter is worthy of more in-depth consid-
erations since some contrasting evidence emerged from the literature review.  
To start with, Battistin et al., (2017) in a study on 191 Italian firms (86% of which family 
firms),  show that private equity funds are able to boost growth in family businesses, but 
only when they acquire a minority stake. According to their view, private equity firms are 
particularly beneficial when they integrate the incumbent management team rather than 
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substituting it. In this context, private equity investors are interested in keeping family 
members in managerial position in order not to lose some of the advantages attached to 
them e.g. long standing relationships with customers and suppliers, family identity, etc. 
In addition, Howorth et al. (2004) noticed that when the previous owners are frequently 
involved in the post-deal years, there are fewer conflicts within the firm, which positively 
impact its overall performance.  
Croce and Martí (2014), by observing 257 private equity backed family firms, confirm 
the positive impact on the post-deal performance in certain cases. Differently from Bat-
tistin et al. (2017),  they split the analysis between founder-controlled and descendent-
controlled family firms and notice that, in the case of founder-controlled firms, there are 
performance improvements after the private equity intervention. However, at the same 
time they argue that performance does not significantly improve in the case of descend-
ant-controlled family firms.  
Following, contrasting evidence comes also from Buttignon et al. (2005), who analysed 
a sample of 21 Italian family business buyouts. According to their conclusions, improve-
ments of growth (sales) and efficiency (EBITDA) measures after the deals are not statis-
tically significant. However, they noticed that, in 70% of the cases, underperforming 
firms prior the investments were the ones performing better after the deals and vice versa, 
highlighting a strong “discontinuity effect” of private equity investors in family busi-
nesses’ performance. Similar results were found by Wulf et al. (2010), who highlighted 
the ability of private equity funds to positively impact performance only on pre-deal un-
derperforming targets.   
Moreover, there seems to be no positive long-term effect of private equity funds on family 
firms. In a paper by Vivani et al. (2008), where 143 IPOs of family firms - both private 
equity backed and non - were studied, no strong evidence of synergies between private 
equity and family ownership emerged.  
In sum, when restricting the impact of private equity investors on the world of family 
business, the positive evidence on target firms’ performance seems not to be as clear as it 
was in the analysis made in paragraph 1.4. In other words, empirical results do not miss 
to show some positive effects of the private equity investing activity on family businesses, 
however, such effects are circumscribed to specific cases.  
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2.5 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 is the nerve centre of this dissertation. It integrated the literature review on 
private equity made in Chapter 1, linking it with the one on family firms. It provided 
insights on the reciprocal advantages and disadvantages that might arise when the two 
realities meet. Also, it showed some evidence on the actual level of interactions within 
private equity houses and family businesses, highlighting the impacts that the latter have 
had on the performance of the former. 
The analysis made overcomes the traditional idea of family firms - typically meant as 
little family-managed enterprises or shops around the corner - explaining that, rather than 
a matter of size, it is a matter of family control over the company and of willingness to 
keep it across generations what actually defines a family business. As discussed, such 
underlying desires strongly influence the decisions taken and consequently the strategies 
adopted by family firms, especially when it comes to financing decisions.  
Following, different theoretical approaches spread light on the apparent incompatibility 
between family firms and private equity. First, from a stewardship perspective, the 
changes brought by buyouts transactions (as seen in Chapter 1), especially due to the 
substitution of managers who are members of the ex-business-owning families, and re-
garded as “stewards”,  negatively affect family firms’ post-deal performance. Second, 
under the SEW point of view, given the socio emotional loss aversion of family members, 
family firms are generally considered reluctant towards losing control and management 
freedom in favour of private equity funds. Plus, losses in SEW following the deals might 
also have negative effect on firms’ performance. Last, reluctance over third-party financ-
ing in these firms is provided even by the POH. Through this theoretical lens, business-
owning families would consider private equity interventions only as a mean of last resort.  
On the flip side, additional literature reviewed showed that there are circumstances in 
which family businesses favourably see private equity financing. This is true especially 
when family firms need the investors’ non-financial resources, for example in order to 
enhance professionalization in operational issues, grow, or overcame succession chal-
lenges.  
Contrary to the family firms’ perspective, private equity sponsors mostly look at family 
business in a favourable way. According to the researches presented, the generally lower 
levels of efficiency and professionalization perceived in family owned firms do not make 
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them less appealing but rather more attractive to private equity funds. This is due to the 
presence of greater room for unlocking unexploited potentials, eventually leading to a 
positive impact on performance and thus high returns.  
Despite the many complications observed (mainly on the family firm side), data on global 
private equity transactions seemed to support a strong interaction between the two parties 
analysed. However, when evidence on portfolio companies’ performance was studied (fo-
cusing on family or ex-family-owned businesses only), the results were not as clear as 
they were in the broader analysis made in Chapter 1. Indeed, in this case a positive impact 
on targets’ performance was observed only in specific types of investments. The aim of 
the work that will follow is therefore that of providing additional evidence on the matter, 
focusing on the case of Italian family firms’ buyouts. In the first place, Chapter 3 will 
present a brief overview of the Italian private equity market over the five years from 2014 
to 2018. Last, in Chapter 4 a sample of 60 family firms’ buyouts will be analysed with 
the purpose of understanding the impact that private equity had on their financial perfor-
mance, possibly identifying also what were the underlying drivers and the characteristics 




THE ITALIAN SCENARIO 
3.1 Introduction 
So far we have showed that the private equity industry has been constantly growing in 
recent years at a European but also at a global level. In particular, in Chapter 1 we pre-
sented some positive, general trends of the private equity activity, which reached record 
results in 2019. Additionally, in Chapter 2 we presented a more granular analysis, focus-
ing on the private equity activity concerning investments in family firms. Now, in order 
to provide further evidence on this last point, especially with the aim of gaining insights 
on the current situation in Italy, this chapter provides a thorough examination of the Ital-
ian private equity market between 2014 and 2018. It starts by showing data on the general 
growth of the market in paragraph 3.2.1. Then, it focuses on information regarding deals 
origination (i.e. the motives underneath private equity transactions), and deals investment 
stage (i.e. early-stage or later-stage investments, as explained in Chapter 1), in paragraphs 
3.2.2 and 3.2.3, respectively. Last, in paragraphs 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, the chapter presents 
some analysis concerning the geographical and sectorial concentration of the deals as well 
as an investigation about the main financial values of the target companies (i.e. sales, 
enterprise value (EV) and EV/EBITDA).   
3.2 Overview of the Italian Market  
As stated above, the general analysis of the Italian market presented in this chapter is 
focused on the period going from 2014 to 2018. First, the reason for this choice is that 
such period comprehends the years in which the deals selected in Chapter 4 were carried 
out. The second reason is linked to the availability of data about the Italian private equity 
market provided by PEM®- an Italian observatory of the private equity market -, which 
are not yet complete for 2019. However, when possible, trends about 2019 are considered 
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according to the partial PEM® information already dispatched through online articles of 
national newspapers. The same holds also for data about the first semester of 2020.  
Despite another national observatory - the Italian Association of Private Equity, Venture 
Capital, and Private Debt (AIFI) - already provided more recent and complete market data 
on its website (which we seldom refer to), we decided not to base the analysis on them 
because the focus of this work is on the private equity segment only (as meant by PEM®), 
whereas AIFI aggregates information about private equity and venture capital and an ex-
post distinction was not always possible to perform.   
3.2.1 Deals Growth 
 
Table 4: Monitored Operations and Active Operators 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
Figure 6: Monitored Operations 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
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In 2018, the total amount of resources invested in the Italian private equity and venture 
capital markets - especially thanks to some large scale operations in the buyout segment 
- reached its highest peak ever. At the end of the year, more than 1.200 target companies 
were included in the portfolio of private equity and venture capital funds operating in 
Italy, representing a counter value at the historical cost of acquisition of 33 billion Euro 
(AIFI, 2018).  
Considering the private equity market only, in the years from 2014 to 2018, with the sole 
exception 2016, the private equity activity in Italy saw a continuous growth both in terms 
of deals number and active operators. Table 4 and Figure 6 above show the evolution in 
the number of operations monitored by PEM® in those years and that of the number of 
active operators. 
In total, during the 5 years considered, 596 operations were carried out through highly 
heterogeneous strategies, meaning that the final number includes minority and majority 
stake acquisitions, acquisitions of the whole target companies, buyout investments, sec-
ondary buyouts, turnaround investments, etc., as we will see further on in the chapter. 
More in detail, after a quasi-stable progression of the market in the first years, when deals 
went up from 89 in 2014 to 109 in 2015 and then down to 100 in 2016, the market saw a 
sharp increase in 2017 and 2018, when at the end the number of total deals reached 175. 
The growth continued in 2019, year in which 221 operations were observed. The number 
in the first semester of 2020 - despite the negative economic impact of Covid-19 -  is 93, 
which is in line with the first semester of 2019 (Malpensa24, 2020). Following, the num-
ber of active private equity firms for the period considered in the table had a trend coher-
ent with that of the number of deals, reaching its peak (125) in 2018. To conclude, in 
terms of market concentration, in 2018 the market resulted less concentrated than in the 
previous years, with 29 players gathering 50% of all the activities (compared to 22 in 
2017 and 20 in 2014) (PEM® report, 2014;2015;2016;2017;2018). 
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3.2.2 Deals Origination 
Moving to a deeper level of analysis, Table 5 and Figure 7 above show how the majority 
of operations were originated by a change in ownerships from family shareholders, inter-
ested in divesting, to new groups of shareholders, interested in taking control of the com-
panies (Family and Private).  
In particular, family and private transactions, on average, accounted for 67% of the total 
deals, reaching a peak of 79% in 2018. The results are in line with the data presented in 
Chapter 2 and can be seen as a consequence of the characteristics of the Italian business 
environment, mainly composed by family firms managed by the founder and/or its family.  
In addition, they follow the trend already identified in the analysis performed by Butti-
gnon et al. (2005) on deals from 1995 to 2003. In their words, interventions on family 
Table 5: Deals Origination 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
Figure 7: Deals Origination 2014 -2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
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business were “one of the most common investment rationale for a private equity opera-
tor, who has to implement the generational change as well as the ensuing restructuring of 
the company in terms of financial, strategic and organizational aspects” (Buttignon et al., 
2005). 
Also, according to recent news the investments in family companies accounted for 77% 
of the total deals realized in 2019, confirming their strong predominance (Malpensa24, 
2020). 
The other types of deal origination, clearly a neat minority compared to the category 
“Family and Private”, could be defined as follow: 
a) “Foreign Parent”: disposal of business units from foreign groups;  
b) “Local Parent”: disposal of business units from national groups;  
c) “Other”: deal types not classified; 
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3.2.3 Deals Investment Stage 
With reference to the number of operations by stage of investment, throughout the period 
considered buyouts were by far the leading type of investment performed by private eq-
uity funds.  
As depicted in Figure 8 above, from 2015 onwards they always represented more than 
66% of the total investments, reaching a peak of 72% in 2018. On average instead, during 
the 5 years buyouts represented 71% of the total number of deals. More recent data con-
firmed such trend for the first semester of 2020, signalling that buyouts accounted for 
80% of total operations monitored (Malpensa24, 2020). According to AIFI (2020), the 
predominance of buyouts as investment type confirms how operators concentrate their 
attention towards deals in which the acquisition of a majority equity stake allows them to 
maximize returns.  
Table 6: Deals Investment Stage 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
 Figure 8: Deals Investment Stage 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
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As for what concerns expansion investments, they are the only type other than buyout 
with a significant market quote. Such quote was 23% considering a 5-year average, with 
a peak of 35% in 2014.  
Following, turnaround and replacement investments represented (always on average in 
the 5-year period) only 5%, and 1% of the total number of investments, respectively.  
3.2.4 Geographic Area and Sector 
Geographical Distribution 
Considering the geographical distribution of the 596 deals occurred from 2014 to 2018, 
we can see that it is mainly concentrated in Northern Italy, as shown in Figure 9. In par-
ticular, Lombardia, Emilia Romagna, Veneto, and Piemonte together accounted for 75% 
of the deals.  
This trend, once again, is confirmed in 2019 and in the first semester of 2020, when the 
four regions collected around 73% of the total deals. The involvement of businesses in 
Southern Italy instead remains stable at around 4% (Malpensa24, 2020). Not surprisingly 
- especially considering how the economic activity in general is mostly concentrated in 
the northern part of the peninsula - also Buttignon et al. (2005), analysing the period from 
1998 to 2003, reported a similar result for the geographical distribution of “Family and 
Figure 9: Geographic distribution 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
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Private” deals in Lombardia, Emilia Romagna, Piemonte, and Veneto, which at that time 
accounted for 82% of the total transactions.  
Sector Distribution 
Moving on, an overview of the sectors involved is presented. It is of paramount im-
portance to understand which sectors attracted most deals since the sector concentration 
has a strong impact on other variables of the analysis, for instance median sales and En-
terprise Value (EV) of target companies. During the five years, the surveys constantly 
showed a preference of market players for the traditional compartment of industrial prod-
ucts (33% of total deals), followed by consumer goods (20%), and food and beverage 
(11%), as depicted in Figure 10 below.  
More in detail, the industrial products sector attracted 32% of the deals in 2018 while the 
consumer goods and the food and beverage sectors collected 20% and 13% of them, re-
spectively. According to new data, the results of 2019 are in line with those of 2018. Also, 
at the end of 2020 such preferences should be confirmed given that in the first semester 
the industrial products and food and beverage sectors alone gathered almost 50% of the 




Figure 10: Sector Distribution 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
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3.2.5 Targets Financials 
A further analysis performed in the Italian private equity market by PEM® regards the 
median size of the target companies in terms of sales and Enterprise Value and the median 
EV/EBITDA multiple of the transactions. By plotting data from Table 7, we can see in 
Figure 11 and 12 how these variables changed over the period considered. In particular, 
the median sales of target companies reached a peak of €54 million in 2014 and then 
declined to the lowest value of €34.2 in 2015. After 2015, they gradually started to in-
crease up to almost €40 million in 2016, almost €42 million in 2017 and to €44.5 million 
in 2018. More in depth, the upward trend is explained by a reduction of the investments 
into targets which did not exceed €60 million (58% in 2018 compared to 60% in 2017), 
together with an increase of investments in big enterprises (9% in 2018 compared to 6% 
Table 7: Median Targets Financials 2014 - 2018 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
 Figure 11: Median Targets Sales and EV 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
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in 2017) (PEM® Report, 2018). Data for 2019, instead, showed a trend reversal, with the 
median sales down to €35.6 million (Malpensa24, 2020).  
Moving to the median Enterprise Value (EV), it mainly followed the trend of the median 
sales. It did so also in 2019 when, according to data reported in recent articles, its median 
value was down to around €75 million (Malpensa24, 2020). In short, after 4 years of 
constant growth both in terms of sales and EV of the median target firms, in 2019 private 
equity operators changed this trend and focused more in smaller businesses. Such evi-
dence comes also from the lower number of employers of the median target, which 
dropped to 112 compared to 142 in 2018 (AIFI, 2020).  
Moving to the analysis of the EV/EBITDA multiple, as shown in Figure 12 below, it 
gradually increased from a value of 7,10x in 2014 to its highest value of 10,1x in 2018. 
According to PEM® analysts, the constant expansion of the multiples is due, in the first 
place, to the increasing competition among private equity players brought especially by 
foreign funds interested in investing in the Italian market and with large capitals availa-
bility. This is also reflected by the decreasing concentration of the market players, as 
described in section 3.2.1. In the second place, the investments in prestigious companies 
of the Italian industrial arena - either because of their prestigious brands or their leader-
ship position in the market - also contributed to the growth of the median EV/EBITDA 
multiple. On the other side, it is reasonable to assume that the median EV/EBITDA mul-
tiple growth is not linked to different sectors’ characteristics. Indeed, as explained in sec-
tion 3.2.4, during the period considered the private equity activity did not see any relevant 
change in the first three sectors involved in terms of number of operations. Last, the me-
dian value of the multiple registered in 2019 is 9,1x (Malpensa24, 2020), slightly lower 
than that of 2018. The reason is probably linked to the smaller size of the median target 
firm, as explained above. 
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3.3 Conclusions 
The analysis made in this chapter highlighted a very active and attractive market for pri-
vate equity in Italy. Data on deals growth showed a persistent increase in operations and 
active operators in the years considered. The  peak was reached in 2018, when 175 deals 
were concluded by 125 private equity houses.  Buyouts consistently represented the pre-
ferred stage of investment, followed by expansion, turnaround and replacement invest-
ments. In terms of deal origination, family firms  were by far the most popular targets. In 
fact, in only 5 years investments in this category grew from 42 deals (in 2014) to 139 (in 
2018), representing almost 80% of the total market.  Concerning the geographical area 
and the sectorial distribution, Lombardia, Emilia Romagna and Veneto alone gathered 
66% of total deals, while the most appealing sectors were the ones related to industrial 
products, consumer goods and food and beverage, which together  accounted for 64% of 
total deals.  Last, with regard to targets financials, the median sales value was of €44,5 
million in 2018, whereas, median enterprise value and EV/EBITDA were of €95,5 million 
and 10,1 points, respectively. Each of these three numbers increased from 2015 to 2018, 
Figure 12: Median Targets EV/EBITDA 
Source: Personal elaboration of PEM® data 
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reasonably as a consequence of the increasing competition in the market which brought 
private equity houses to look for more prestigious targets and pushed multiples up.  
Concluding, the data presented in this chapter, which specifically focused on the Italian 
market,  are in line with the more general ones presented in Chapter 2. They further proved 
a strong interaction between private equity firms and family businesses, giving us the 
necessary material to reach one of our minor objectives. Following, in order to address 
the main purpose of this dissertation, Chapter 4 will finally look at the effects of family 
firms’ buyouts on targets’ financial performance. 
 
4. CHAPTER  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we discussed how the world of private equity and its way of 
creating value in portfolio companies might seem in deep contrast with the business logics 
of family firms, making the two economic actors appear completely incompatible. None-
theless, we also showed that such point of view is not always appropriate and the reasons, 
as highlighted in Chapter 2, lie on the potential reciprocal benefits that private equity and 
family businesses might gain from their interactions. Data on transactions are clearly in 
favour of this last argument, indeed, despite business-owning families are often reluctant 
to lose control over their firms, family businesses buyouts persistently showed a positive 
growth trend over the last years. However, the analysis made in Chapter 2 concerning the 
post-deal family firms’ performance did not show a clear pattern, especially if compared 
with the more general one performed in Chapter 1. The goal of the following pages of 
this dissertation is therefore that of providing additional evidence on the impact of private 
equity deals on family firms’ financial performance.  
We studied 60 buyouts transactions performed on Italian family firms between 2014 and 
2018. Initially, we presented a brief overview of the main aspects related to the deals 
observed, including the years when they were performed, the equity stake acquired, the 
geographical locations of the target companies as well as their sectors. Then, in order to 
understand the impact on growth, efficiency, profitability, and capital structure, we car-
ried out a quantitative analysis based on 13 financial indicators extrapolated from firms’ 
financial statements. The results are presented in section 4.3. Following, mostly due to 
the misleading effects of some accounting rules related to buyouts, which negatively af-
fected the interpretation of most variables, we performed a more qualitative investigation 
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regarding the trends of the most relevant indicators of performance, namely sales and 
EBITDA margin. The outcome of this last investigation is presented and discussed from 
section 4.4 to 4.5. 
4.2 Analysis of selected deals  
In order to provide additional evidence about the impact of private equity investors on 
family firms, an analysis of a sample of buyouts conducted in Italy between 2014 and 
2016 was performed.    
The existing literature focused on the performance of  private equity portfolio companies 
by studying their financial statements with different approaches. On the one hand, some 
studies tried to spread some light on the impact of the investors by comparing the targets’ 
performance in the years pre-deal with those post-deal (e.g. Buttignon et al., 2005; 
Kaplan, 1989; Opler, 1992). On the other hand, other studies did so by comparing the 
performance of the portfolio companies with that of a carefully selected benchmark not 
involved in any private equity deal (e.g. Battistin et al, 2017; Guo et al., 2011).  
In this work, the first approached was adopted and thus the performance of the target 
family firms was thoroughly examined in the two years preceding the deal and in the three 
years following it. In the first place, the two years before the investments were useful to 
understand the financial trends in the observed indicators for any target company. Second, 
the two years following the deal were needed to show the impact of the investments in 
those indicators over time. Note that the observed time frame of the post-deal observa-
tions is slightly shorter than the average private equity holding period: the choice  was a 
compromise between the need to track the post-deal performance as much as possible and 
the need to avoid the impact of possible exit strategies (which for some of the selected 
deals occurred exactly after two years) on the accounting data.   
Moreover, the choice of focusing on Italian family firms only was tied to the availability 
of information about private equity deals and the necessary supporting data (i.e. financial 
statements).  
Last, the choice of buyouts over other investment types was taken according to two ne-
cessities. First,  the need of abstracting as much as possible from governance issues that 
normally arise in minority investments. Coherently, in the sample of family firm-buyouts 
selected for the analysis, the average equity stake bought by the private equity investors 
is 74%. 
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Second, as discussed in the previous chapters, buyouts almost certainly make sure that a 
restructuring process in governance and managerial aspects of the company occurs, al-
lowing in this way the private equity house to implement all the typical value creating 
activities. Indeed, in 98% of the observed cases in our sample either the CEO or other 
figures in the management team of the portfolio companies were replaced the deals.  
4.2.1 Data collection  
For the purpose of the analysis, an original dataset was created by collecting information 
from three different sources: PEM® annual reports, the Aida database provided by Bureau 
Van Dijk, and private equity firms’ websites. 
The data-gathering and elaboration process was conducted as follows. To begin with, 
PEM® annual reports of 2014, 2015, and 2016 were downloaded and elaborated in order 
to assemble a set of private equity transactions carried out in those years. Choosing the 
years of analysis, some issues were taken into consideration: on the one hand, the need to 
track the target companies’ financial performance up to 2 years pre-deal (from T-1 to T-
2) and 2 years post-deal (from T1 to T2), coherently with the motivations explained 
above. On the other hand, the availability of the accounting data from Aida, which are 
normally provided for the 10-year period going from 2009 to 2019 (even though data for 
2019 are often still missing). This is to say that the analysis could not be performed 
properly on deals completed in 2017, and that it could not be performed at all on deals 
occurred after 2017. Whereas, deals concluded in years previous to 2014 were not con-
sidered in order to reduce as much as possible the effect of the 2008 global crisis on the 
analysis of the pre-deal firm performance (thus, the earliest pre-deal year considered was 
2011). 
In its first form, the dataset contained 298 deals completed by national and international 
investors interested in Italian target companies. From this point, the results were filtered 
according to the origination of the deals and their investment stage: only those involving 
“Buyouts” on “Family and Private” transactions were selected (for a detailed definition 
of “Buyouts” and “Family and Private” deals see section 1.2.2 and 3.2.2), leaving the 
dataset with 128 records. The resulting sample, however, had to be further reduced to 60 
records: this is the final number of observation on which the statistical analysis was per-
formed. The reasons for the last curb were the following:  
- The target’s firm financial statements were not available in Aida; 
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- The target’s firm financial statements were not available for all the years included 
in the analysis; 
- The target’s firm financial statements were not comparable due to the nature of 
the deal e.g. the target firm was merged with other already existing companies. 
After the 60 target companies (for which complete and comparable data are available) 
were identified, their balance sheets and income statements (from year T-2 to year T2) 
were collected and elaborated in order to gather the following financial information:  
- Turnover, EBITDA, and Net Income; 
- Fixed assets, Net Working Capital; 
- Financial debt, taxes; 
- N. of employees. 
Consequently, from the accounting data the following set of ratios were computed:  
- ROS (Return on Sales), ROA (Return on Assets), and ROE (Return on Equity); 
- Employees’ productivity.  
Then, in order to adjust target companies’ turnovers included in the dataset - as specified 
in section 4.2.2 - information about sector’s trends was collected from the Istat’s website, 
section “national accounts; “data and microdata”; “output and value added by industry”.  
Last, for the qualitative analysis performed in paragraph  4.5.4, we integrated the infor-
mation found in PEM® annual reports and the Aida database by looking at specific data 
on each private equity fund’s website: these are summarized in Table 15. 
4.2.2 Methodology 
In order to understand the impact of the private equity investments on target firms, a 
comparison between their performance on years pre-deal (T-) and years post-deal (T+) 
was carried out. As a first step, turnovers from financial statements were adjusted for 
every company according to the relative macro-sector trends. The operation was done by 
normalizing the indicators in T and consequently subtracting the appropriate sector’s 
trend to each company’s trend. The effect is that a turnover’s increase is reduced where 
the related sector’s trend is positive and vice versa. In such a way, target companies’ 
results are abstracted as much as possible from the economic performance of the markets 
in which they operate, consequently linking every change in the data more closely to the 
company’s characteristics first, and to the private equity activity then.  
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Following, the mean for every indicator was calculated distinguishing from period T- and 
T+, thus resulting in the following two means for each variable for each company: Mean 
T- and Mean T+. In other words, considering the example of turnover, for every company 
Mean T+ represents the mean turnover in years  T1 and T2, while Mean T- is the mean 
turnover in years T-1 and T-2.  
To assess the statistical significance between the difference in the two means, a Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test was performed. In short, the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is a non-para-
metric test used to evaluate whether the median difference of two correlated samples is 
significant or not. It was selected as a preferred option over the T-test given the small size 
of the sample studied and the non-normal distribution of the means of the variables con-
sidered. Eventually, such test allowed for a better analysis of the data used, also providing 
more statistically significant results. 
Last, as previously done by Buttignon et al. (2005), a comparison of the trends pre and 
post-deals in the most significant indicators was conducted. For this purpose, following 
the existing literature, turnover and EBITDA margin were selected: the former variable 
was considered as a good proxy for the development of competitive strength, while the 
latter as a good proxy for the overall level of efficiency achieved (Buttignon et al., 2005). 
The trends were identified by performing a linear regression with turnover and EBITDA 
margin as dependent variables, and using time as the independent one. Therefore, the 
values expressed under the labels “Trend -”  and “Trend +” represent the slope of the line 
that best approximates the pattern of the two above mentioned variables over the years, 
namely their trends. The impact of the private equity investors instead was thought to be 
summarised in their delta.   
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4.2.3 The deals 
Considering the sample of 60 family firms on which the empirical analysis was con-
ducted, 13 of them were carried out in 2014 (21% of the total), while the remaining 47 
were concluded in 2015 (37%) and in 2016 (42%), as Table 8 shows.  
The buyouts considered were concluded by 44 Italian and international PE houses, all of 
which acquired a majority equity stake in the selected target company. The share of equity 
bought ranged from 50% to 100%, with a mean value of 74% over the three years ob-
served (Table 9). 
In line with the data presented in Chapter 3, the geographical distribution of the selected 
deals is mostly concentrated in Northern Italy (Figure 13). The most represented Italian 
regions - accounting for 80% of total deals - were Lombardia (29 deals), Emilia Romagna 
(12 deals), and Veneto (7 deals). Piemonte and Toscana collect together 10% of the deals, 
with 3 transactions for each region. The other 10% of the deals was almost evenly spread 
among Trentino Alto Adige, Liguria, Lazio and Friuli Venezia Giulia. No Southern Italy 
regions were involved in the transactions considered in the sample. 
Table 8: Deals per Year 
Source: Personal elaboration 
 
Table 9: Mean equity stake and n. of PE houses 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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Following, if we consider the sectorial distribution of the deals, Figure 14 below shows 
how they are concentrated in the industrial products and financial services sectors, which 
include 50% of the deals analysed. More in particular, 18 transactions (30%) occurred in 
the industrial products sector, while 12 (20%) in the financial services sector. Following, 
the food and beverage and other profession and social services sectors accounted for 13% 
and 10% of the deals, respectively. Other 6 sectors accounted for the remaining part 
(28%) of the transactions. 
Figure 14: Deals per Sector 
Source: Personal elaboration 
Figure 13: Deals per Region 
Source: Personal elaboration. 
 
Do private Equity Investments improve financial performance in Family Firms? Evidence from Italy. 
70 
4.2.4  Variables and summary statistics 
As already stated, the effects of buyouts on target family firms were empirically analysed 
through a set of indicators based on financial statements’ data. The statistical analysis was 
concentrated on those accounting lines and ratios that should best represent the effect of 
the private equity activities - as explained in Chapter 1 and 2 - and, more in general, the 
overall performance of a company. Consistently, some variables were considered as a 
proxy for the degree of growth (e.g. turnover and number of employees), whereas some 
others as a proxy for the degree of efficiency reached (e.g. EBITDA, EBITDA margin, 
productivity), and others for the level of profitability (e.g. ROE, Net Income/Turnover). 
In addition, the impact of the investment activity on targets’ capital structure was ob-
served thanks to indicators such as tax on turnover and the level of financial debt on 
turnover.  
Note that some variables were divided by the total sales of the respective years in order 
to remove the target company size’s effect.  
Table 10 includes the variables utilized in the analysis, reporting their means and standard 
deviations for each year (from T-2 to T2) observed. In the second panel, the same data 
are normalized in T. 
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4.3 Impact of private equity investors on family firms 
Table 11 below shows the differences in the means of the observed variables in the two 
years post-deal (Mean T+) and in the two years pre-deal (Mean T-). Column W reports 
the W-values of the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, while the last column indicates their 
level of significance. 
Certain levels of significance were found between Mean T+ and Mean T- in most varia-
bles, namely Turnover, ROS, ROA, ROE, Tax/Turnover, Net Income/Turnover, Fixed 
assets/Turnover, Financial Debt/Turnover, Nr. Of Employees, and Productivity. 
Whereas, the differences in the means of the remaining variables considered did not show 
any statistically relevant trend at this level of analysis.  
Following, the relevant indicators are clustered into subgroups in order to understand 
what was the impact on portfolio companies under different point of views. In particular, 
growth, operating efficiency, capital structure, and profitability.  
4.3.1 Growth 
Portfolio companies’ growth is assessed by looking at three indicators, namely: turnover, 
Fixed Assets/Turnover, and Nr. Of Employees.  
To begin with, the average turnover significantly increased from T- to T+, suggesting that 
most target companies where able to grow in the two years post-deal. Noteworthy is that 
Table 11: Mean values T+ and T- 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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data on turnover are not adjusted for inflation, therefore part of the growth might be re-
lated to an overall increase in the level of prices. However, according to data provided by 
Istat, average inflation on the periods associated with T- and T+ was very low (approxi-
mately 1%) and therefore it did not significantly affect turnover’s values.  
Coherently with the results showed by the first indicator, both fixed assets on turnover 
and the number of employees were higher in T+ with respect to T-, supporting the fact 
that target companies grew after the PE investment. Clearly, any growth strategy at a 
certain point must be backed by growing underlying assets and human capital, which ties 
together the upward trend of these three variables. Even so, the extraordinary increase in 
the level of fixed assets as compared to turnover calls for further investigation. Most 
likely, a substantial part of the difference between its mean in T- and T+ is a consequence 
of the assets revaluation of the target companies - mainly concerning fixed tangible and 
intangible assets - that normally follows private equity deals (as explained in Chapter 1 
and also observed by Buttignon et al. (2005)), rather than the effect of actual organic or 
external growth.  
Concluding, although the value of fixed assets on turnover might suffer of a significant 
upward bias, altogether the three variables taken into consideration so far seem to indicate 
that family firms were able to grow in the years post-deal as compared to those pre-deal.   
4.3.2 Operating efficiency 
To evaluate the impact on operating efficiency, ROA, ROS, Productivity, EBITDA Mar-
gin, and Net Working Capital/Turnover were taken into consideration.  
ROA - measured as operating income (i.e. Earnings Before Interests and Taxes (EBIT)) 
on total assets - substantially decreased in T+ as compared to T-. Since the ratio indicates 
the ability of a company to efficiently exploit its assets in order to generate operating 
profits, at first sight its decline might be linked to a loss in operating efficiency. However, 
the misleading effect of assets’ revaluation, which mechanically brings ROA down,  in-
validate a correct interpretation of the indicator. In fact, net of the revaluation effect, it 
could also be possible that ROA would be higher in T+ with respect to T-, driving the 
analysis on operating efficiency to the opposite conclusion.  
Continuing in this direction, also ROS - measured as operating income on total sales - 
visibly decreased after the investments. Again, the ratio is used to evaluate a company’s 
operational efficiency and, in particular, it indicates how much operating profit is gained 
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for every euro of sales. Hence, its decline signals that target companies in T+ were not as 
efficient as in T- in transforming revenues into profits. The reasons for the deterioration 
of the margin might be many and are to be found in the accounting lines between sales 
and EBIT. To put it differently, in order to understand the negative impact on ROS, as-
sumptions could be made about an overall increase of operating costs - such as sales and 
marketing, salary and wages, or depreciation and amortisation - which did not translate 
in augmented sales, thus lowering the margin of portfolio companies. Unfortunately at 
this level of analysis no conclusions could be drawn on the investments’ impact on oper-
ating expenses as a whole. However, something might be observed with regard to depre-
ciation and amortisation. Indeed, it is very plausible that they increased unproportionally 
with respect to sales (still due to the revaluation of fixed assets), thus strongly contributing 
to the reduction of EBIT first and, eventually, of ROS. As a consequence, even in this 
case the decline of the ratio cannot be directly linked to a worsening operating perfor-
mance and calls for additional investigation.  
Following, given the fact that EBITDA Margin, Productivity and Net Working Capi-
tal/Turnover are not influenced from the fixed assets’ value in the balance sheet through 
their related annual costs, their integration in the analysis might help to provide a clearer 
picture of the investments’ effects on operating efficiency. 
In this sense, both Productivity and EBITDA Margin suggest a deterioration of the overall 
level of efficiency. In the first place, the decline in EBITDA Margin - even though not 
statistically significant - might indicate a more than proportional increase of the general 
and administrative expenses as compared to the prices charged by the targets, probably 
as a consequence of the implementation of new growth strategies associated with private 
equity investing.   
Second, employees’ productivity - calculated as total revenues on total labour costs - also 
worsened in the sample of family firms considered. Given the general rise in sales levels, 
the lower level of this margin could be attributed to its denominator. In other words, it 
could be a consequence of the high wages related to talented managers and directors in-
troduced by the investment funds their portfolio companies, which inevitably brought 
labour costs up.  
On the contrary, the reduction of (operating) net working capital on turnover might sug-
gest that family firms were more efficient in managing short term assets and liabilities 
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generating from their core businesses. Indeed, a reduction in net working capital - through 
the mechanisms already explained in section 1.3.3 - allows a company to save financial 
resources that it otherwise would have had to gather with additional external debt. How-
ever, note that the change in the variable is not significant under a statistical point of view.  
In sum, it seems that the private equity activity had a negative effect on the operating 
performance of the sample of target firms analysed, at least in the short run. The evidence, 
however, is clearly supported only by the decline in the productivity level of employees. 
Indeed, ROA and ROS are negatively affected by the revaluation of assets related to ac-
counting rules, which complicates their interpretation, and the decrease in the EBITDA 
Margin, even if existent, is not statistically significant.  
4.3.3 Capital structure and taxes 
Private equity’s impact on capital structure and taxes on the selected family firms is ana-
lysed through the following indicators: Financial Debt/Turnover and Tax/Turnover. On 
the one hand, financial debt on turnover increased substantially in the years post-deal. As 
explained in Chapter 1, this is typical of buyout transactions, which normally involve the 
acquisition of companies through the use of large amount of debt.  
On the other hand, despite tax over turnover significantly declined in T+, the result is not 
necessarily linked to an increase in the interest related deductions, as typically happens 
in the case of buyouts investments (see section 1.3.2). Or, at least, not for its entirety.  In 
fact, it is plausible that the declining trend of the indicator is also associated with the non-
monetary costs related to the fixed assets revaluation, which brought operating profits 
(and consequently the taxable amount) down, rather than only on an increase of the inter-
ests’ fiscal shield.  
4.3.4 Profitability 
The comparison of family firms’ profitability before and after the change of ownership is 
addressed by looking at Net Income/Turnover and ROE (i.e. net income over equity). 
Both indicators show a significant change in their means from T- to T+. In particular, the 
profitability of the family firms in the sample strongly declined in the 3 years following 
the deal, meaning that they were less capable of transforming turnover in actual profits 
on the one hand and, as a direct consequence, less able to remunerate their shareholders 
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on the other. Once again, however, the impact on profitability needs a more careful anal-
ysis than the one just presented: this is because a great portion of the profitability loss 
might not be linked to inappropriate management strategies but rather to the increasing 
amortisation and depreciation costs following the fixed assets revaluation. Nonetheless, 
the fact that even the EBITDA margin declined in T+ with respect to T- would call for 
further investigation also on which part of the cost structure prevented the sample of fam-
ily firms to be as profitable as it was in T- the most.  
4.3.5 Discussion 
The statistical analysis performed above is strongly limited by the assets revaluation that 
follows any private equity buyout. This fact precluded us the opportunity to draw mean-
ingful and exhaustive considerations regarding variables connected to operating effi-
ciency and profitability, which are both affected by the overall increase of amortization 
and depreciation costs. To be more precise, the only evidence that emerged at this level 
of analysis in terms of operating efficiency is related to employees’ productivity, which 
significantly dropped in T+.  
Nevertheless, some significant findings were highlighted with respect to other indicators. 
First, portfolio companies were able to grow substantially in the years post-deals both in 
terms of turnover and of number of employees. Second, the great increase in financial 
debt in the years following the deals confirm the intensive use of debt in buyouts trans-
actions.  
4.4 Trends analysis 
The analysis presented above provides a first understanding of the impact that private 
equity funds had on the selected sample of family firms during the first 3 years from the  
ownership’s change. However, one of the most important indicator for efficiency 
(EBITDA margin) did not show any clear trend so far. Plus, most results are significantly 
affected by the accounting rules associated with buyout transactions, disallowing their 
proper interpretation. Therefore, in order to better comprehend the impact of the invest-
ments, an analysis of the trends of the most relevant variables, namely turnover and 
EBITDA margin, was performed for every company in the two years pre (T-) and the 
three years post-deal (T+) (see Table 12, Figure 15 and Figure 16).  
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Note that, by focusing on the trends of the above mentioned variables for each company, 
it was possible to observe whether the private equity investors were able to steer a declin-
ing performance into a positive one or vice versa. In this way, an additional investigation 
on the “discontinuity effect” of private equity funds highlighted by Buttignon et. al. 
(2005) is also provided.  
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Source: Personal elaboration 
Table 12: Turnover and EBITDA Margin trends pre and post investment 
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4.4.1 Turnover’s trends 
Starting from turnover, the effect of the investments is almost equally split between a 
positive and a negative impact: in 33 cases (55%) the new owners where able to improve 
the growth of sales in T+ compared to T-, while in the remaining 27 cases (45%) the 
variable’s performance deteriorated after the buyout. More in particular, in such cases the 
“discontinuity effect” of the private equity activity was observed 6 times: for these firms, 
the new investors were able to turn a negative sales’ trend into a positive one. In other 6 
cases instead, the private equity funds were able to improve a declining trend but without 
turning it into a positive one. In the remaining 21 cases, private equity houses improved 
an already growing trend.   
Considering the remaining 27 investments, the “discontinuity effect” was observed in 8 
cases, where a positive trend in T- was turned into a negative one in T+. In 4 cases, the 
private equity activity worsened an already declining trend, while, in the remaining 15 
investments family firms were still growing after the change in ownership but at a lower 
rate.  
In sum, private equity investors were able to achieve a better trend in sales in the majority 
of the investments analysed. Also, in 6 cases they turned a declining trend into a positive 
one whereas in 8 cases they turned a positive trend into a negative one. In the remaining 
investments the change in ownership either slowed down an already positive trend or 
Figure 15: Turnover trends 
Source: Personal elaboration 
Do private Equity Investments improve financial performance in Family Firms? Evidence from Italy. 
80 
worsened an already declining one. A graphical representation of such results is provided 
by Figure 15 above. 
4.4.2 EBITDA Margin’s trends 
Moving to the analysis of the EBITDA margin, in 22 cases (37%) the private equity in-
vestors were able to achieve a better trend in the level of efficiency in T+ as compared to 
T-. Whereas, in the remaining 38 cases (63%) the same trend declined in the years pos-
deal. 
More in depth, considering the first 22 cases, in 15 investments the new owners success-
fully transformed a declining EBITDA margin trend into a positive one, while in the re-
maining 7 cases they improved an already positive trend.  
As for what concerns the 38 circumstances in which the private equity funds had a nega-
tive impact on the trend of the margin, in 12 cases such trend was positive also after the 
investment but showed a weaker growth as compared to the years preceding it. In the 
other 26 cases, the trend was always negative after the investments: in 23 occasions the 
new owners turned a positive trend into a negative one, while in the other 3 cases they 
aggravated an already declining trend.  
In sum, in most cases the private equity intervention did not have a positive impact on the 
efficiency trends of the target family firms. Plus, also for this variable many cases showed 
a “discontinuity effect” of the change in ownership: in 38 cases (63%) the trend in T- was 
Figure 16: EBITDA margin trends 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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the opposite of that in T+. Again, a graphical representation of such results is provided 
by Figure 16 above. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
The analysis of the trends let us gather three important results. In the first place, it con-
firms that the majority of family firms’ buyouts had a positive impact on turnover. Sec-
ond, it provides additional evidence on the deterioration of the level of efficiency in T+. 
Indeed, in more than 60% of the firms analysed the EBITDA margin showed a worse 
performance in T- with respect to T+. Last, it emphasise the “discontinuity effect” of 
private equity investments already noticed by Buttignon et al. (2005). In this sense, turn-
over showed an opposite trend (changing both from negative to positive and vice versa) 
in 48% of the investments, while the same happened in 62% of the cases if we consider 
the EBITDA margin.  
In addition to what has been just mentioned, the work presented in this section also lied 
down the ground for the group analysis made in the remaining part of the chapter, which 
constitutes a precious element for understanding what distinguishes successful invest-
ments from failures.  
4.5 Group’s identification 
In order to identify some features in the variables analysed in the most successful invest-
ments and in the failures, family firms were aggregated into different groups according 
to their trends in sales and EBITDA margins. Table 13 and Figure # below show the 4 
different groups that emerged, while in the following sections an explanation of their 
characteristics is provided.  
4.5.1 Group 1 - Positive impact  
In Group 1 (from company number 2 to company number 56 of Table 13, or second 
quadrant of Figure 17), all family firms that showed an improvement both in the turnover 
trend and in the EBITDA margin trend were aggregated. These 15 cases (25% of the total) 
could be considered as successful investments since the target firms involved were able 
to increase their competitive strength after the deal as well as their operating efficiency. 
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4.5.2 Group 2 - Negative Impact  
Group 2 (from company 7 to company 59 of Table 13, or fourth quadrant of Figure 17) 
instead aggregates all the company that were negatively impacted by the private equity 
activity. The 20 family businesses in this group (33% of the total sample) in T+ were 
progressively losing their competitive advantage in the market as well as their capacity to 
operate efficiently, as the declining trends both in turnover and in EBITDA margin indi-
cate.  
4.5.3 Group 3 - Ambiguous impact 
In Group 3 (from company 1 to company 58 of Table 13, or first and third quadrant of 
Figure 17), the impact of the new ownership in the 25 family firms (42% of the total) was 
not clear. On the one hand, for company 1 to 60 the investments improved the trends in 
turnover while reducing that of EBIDTA margin. On the other hand, for company 1 to 
58, the investments positively affected the trends in EBITDA margin while reducing 
those in turnover. 
  
Figure 17: Targets groups 
Source: Personal elaboration 
The Italian Scenario 
83 
 
Table 13: Targets groups 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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4.5.4 Discussion 
From the 3 groups identified above we can conclude that in the majority of the cases 
(67%), private equity funds’ investments had a positive impact on target family firms at 
least under one of the aspects considered (competitive strength and/or operating effi-
ciency).  
On the other hand, the remaining 33% of the deals did not allow the family businesses to 
improve their main financial indicator under the new ownership structure.  
In order to provide a possible explanation to the ambiguous results observed for Group 3, 
it must be noted that a temporary decline in profitability might be accepted in the view of 
acquiring a larger market share and boost sales. Also, a temporary decline in sales could 
be tolerated in the short run for the sake of profitability (Buttignon et al., 2005). Hence, 
for the family businesses in this group it could be reasonable to assume that the strategies 
implemented by the new investors are still in their central stage and, consequently, a 
clearer picture of their effect would take more than two to three years to explicate.  
Moreover, if we consider the mean values of turnover and EBITDA margin for the first 
two groups of firms in the years preceding the deal (Table 14 below), together with the 
relative trends, some interesting evidence emerge.  
In the first place, Group 1 (the one including the most successful investments), was the 
group with the worst average performance in terms of turnover trend in T-. Plus, it was 
the group that showed (on average) the lowest average EBITDA margin, both in compar-
ison with the other two groups and the entire sample. Also, the trend in this variable was 
strongly negative.  
Second, Group 2 (the one related to unsuccessful investments) in the years prior the 
change in ownership was conducting an opposite and therefore better performance with 
respect to that of Group 1. Indeed, it showed (on average) a growing turnover and a 
Table 14: Group 1-2 means and trends 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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strongly growing EBITDA margin trends. Plus, this last indicator was also at higher levels 
as compared to the sample in Group 1. 
Following, other aspects were taken into consideration in order to provide a possible ex-
planation for the opposite performance observed in the two groups.  First, we looked at 
the sectors in which portfolio companies operate as well as at their longevity (since, as 
showed in Chapter 2, founder-controlled and descendants-controlled family business 
might present different reaction to private equity investments). Under a sectorial perspec-
tive, there was not a clear demarcation between companies of Group 1 with respect to 
those in Group 2. On the contrary, some sectors frequently appeared both within the com-
panies positively affected by the investments as well as in those negatively affected. Dif-
ferent results were found with regard to portfolio companies’ age: on average, companies 
belonging to Group 1 are 14 years younger than those in Group 2, suggesting that private 
equity strategies are more difficult to implement in relatively older companies, where the 
family culture might play a bigger role. 
Second, we observed some variables related to the private equity houses involved in the 
deals, in particular their country of origin (as for possible cultural gaps), their years of 
experience in the industry, and the equity stake acquired (as a proxy of the level of inte-
gration between the family and the private equity sponsors after the buyout). With regard 
to the country of origin, again no interesting conclusions could be drawn: private equity 
houses in both groups were almost equally split between Italian and international firms. 
However, more appealing results appeared by looking at the years of experience. In detail, 
family businesses in Group 1 were mainly acquired by private equity firms established in 
the 1990s, which showed, on average, an experience of more than 28 years in the field.  
On the other side, family businesses in Group 2 were acquired by relatively younger pri-
vate equity houses: in this case most of them were established in the 2000s or even more 
recently and, on average, showed less than 18 years of experience. This evidence there-
fore suggests a positive correlation between private equity firms’ experience and targets 
performance. Concerning the average equity stake acquired instead, the two groups did 
not present any significant difference.  
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Table 15 summarises the findings exposed above: 
4.6 Conclusions 
The goal of this dissertation was to understand the “reciprocal sympathy” between private 
equity and family firms as well as to investigate the performance implications of private 
equity buyouts on this particular type of businesses, especially with regard to growth, 
efficiency, capital structure and profitability. We started by defining the characteristics 
and the modus-operandi of the two actors, highlighting the points of convergency and 
those of divergency. In this sense, we stressed what resources and what capabilities the 
private equity industry has to offer to the world of family businesses in order to attract 
them and help them overcome its main challenges. More specifically, we identified the 
financial resources, the managerial competencies, and the accumulated experience in fac-
ing transgenerational issues as the most appealing private equity’s assets to family firms. 
On the flip side, we showed how the willingness of the business-owning families to retain 
control over the firms - mainly linked to the SEW loss aversion and the desire to keep 
stewardship roles - might prevent a priori the conclusion of potentially beneficial deals. 
To spread some light on what actually is the “reciprocal feeling” between the two parties, 
we therefore performed an analysis of the Italian private equity market in the years from 
2014 to 2018: the results highlighted a strong connection between private equity and fam-
ily firms, with the number of transactions persistently growing during the five years ob-
served. In detail, the number of deals originated from family firms went up to 139 (79% 
of the total) in 2018 from 42 (47% of the total) in 2014. Also, among these deals, buyouts 
were by far the predominant type of investments. Linking these findings to the literature 
review, they might suggest that family firms are starting to progressively become more 
flexible with regard to strategic and financing decision, even at the expense of losing full 
Table 15: Group 1-2 variables 
Source: Personal elaboration 
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control over the company. Most likely, the fact that family businesses often lack the nec-
essary financial resources needed to remain competitive, together with their generally 
lower levels of professionalization (combined with the ever-growing complexities of 
many industries), and the lack of experience in transgenerational passages (which are by 
definition a once in a lifetime event), is what is driving these results.  
The analysis of the Italian private equity market was also our starting point for addressing 
the main goal of the thesis, which consisted in adding evidence on what impact family 
firms’ buyouts have on targets’ financial performance. In these terms, from the data col-
lected we identified a sample of 60 deals concerning family firms’ buyouts carried out in 
the years going from 2014 to 2016. Following the existing literature (Buttignon et al., 
2005; Opler, 1992), the 60 portfolio companies were studied focusing mostly on selected 
accounting data: these were analysed over a 5-year period (pre and post-deal) in order to 
assess the evolution of the financial performance. However, also non-accounting varia-
bles were taken into account, both related to the targets and the private equity firms.  
In the first place, we observed the effects on growth through the change in turnover, value 
of fixed assets and number of employees. The statistical analysis performed showed a 
significant increase in the level of sales in the years following the buyouts as compared 
to the ones preceding it. The same results were observed both for the value of fixed assets 
and for the number of employees. However, noteworthy is that a great part in the change 
in value of fixed assets is most likely associated to buyouts accounting rules rather than 
on organic or external growth, as previously observed also by Buttignon et al. (2005). As 
a matter of fact, the implications of such accounting rules, especially through the increase 
in amortization and depreciation costs, disallowed for any conclusion regarding other var-
iables, in particular ROS, ROA, ROE, and Net Income/Turnover. In addition, other 
measures of operating efficiency such as EBITDA margin and operating net working cap-
ital did not show any statistically significant result. As a consequence, we were not able 
to draw any relevant conclusion regarding the impact on efficiency and on profitability at 
this level of analysis if not for the employees’ productivity levels (i.e. euros of sales 
gained per euro of labour cost spent): these dropped in the two years followed the buyouts, 
probably due to higher wages corresponded to new managers and directors. For what 
concerns the capital structure instead, the levels of financial debt greatly increased in the 
years post-deals while the taxes paid decreased, as it normally happens in buyouts. It is 
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important to note, however, that part of the reduction in taxes might not be linked to the 
higher interests tax shield, but rather to the higher operating expenses following the assets 
revaluation.  
Last, following the methodology employed by Buttignon et al. (2005), we clustered target 
companies into groups according to their trends in sales and EBITDA margin. In the first 
place, this step let us make up for the unconclusive statistical analysis regarding the im-
pact of private equity sponsors on targets’ efficiency; second, it allowed us to further 
investigate the “discontinuity effect” on performance of family firms’ buyouts, as firstly 
observed by Buttignon et al. (2005); third, it built the basis to investigate some of the 
qualitative factors that might distinguish successful investments from failures. In detail, 
the trend analysis showed that in most cases (63% of the total) the investments were 
linked to a negative impact on the EBITDA margin - which either grew less than before, 
declined more than before or started to decline -, thus suggesting that family firms’ buy-
outs, on average, are not linked to efficiency improvements. On the contrary, private eq-
uity sponsors seem to care more about sales improvement, as observed in 55% of the 
cases in the sample and already showed in the statistical analysis. Following, the work on 
trends confirmed a strong “discontinuity effect” on targets’ performance. Indeed, in 62% 
of the cases the EBITDA margin trends either turned positive from negative or vice versa; 
while, in 48% of the cases the same happened for the turnover trends. Last, by identifying 
the successful cases and the failures (i.e. by separating investments that positively im-
pacted both sales and EBITDA margin from investments that negatively impacted the 
same variables) we were able to look at some of the characteristics that differentiated the 
two groups. In particular, we noticed the targets in the successful group were the one with 
the worst performance in the two years prior the deal, while the opposite holds for the 
failures. Similar results were presented also in Buttignon et al. (2005) and Wulf et al. 
(2010). In particular, Buttignon et al. (2005) related such findings to the possible presence 
of information asymmetries in the negotiation phase, which led to an overpay of the tar-
gets. In our case, we checked other variables that might have affected the two different 
performances, namely target firms’ industry and longevity, private equity firms’ country 
of origin, years of experience and amount of equity stake acquired. It eventually appeared 
that the only two additional differences between the two groups are related to the experi-
ence of the private equity houses and the longevity of portfolio firms. On average, private 
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equity firms that concluded successful investments could boast 10 years of additional 
experience in the field as compared to the ones involved in the failures. Plus, companies 
in the successful group are, on average, 14 years younger than those in the group of fail-
ures. Therefore, we add to the hypothesis of Buttignon et al. (2005) by suggesting that 
more experienced private equity houses are more capable of recognizing the right type of 
family firms in which to invest and of implementing the right value creation strategies. 
Also, adding to the findings of Croce and Martí (2014), we argue that the implementation 
of private equity strategies in young family firms might be more efficient and produce 
better results as compared to investment in older ones. Last, through a SEW lens, and 
contrary to Buttignon et al. (2005), we hypothesize that owning-families of underper-
forming firms, in order to safeguard the future of the company, are more willing to coop-
erate with private equity sponsors both during the negotiation and the years following the 
deal, hence allowing for reduced information asymmetries, increased synergies and even-
tually for a greater, positive impact on performance. Indeed, an appropriate exchange of 
information between the family and the private equity investors often seems to increase 
the likelihood of a satisfying transaction outcome in the long-term (Howorth et al., 2004). 
Summarising, despite the evident contrasting logics that characterise the two economic 
actors, data on transactions show an increasing “reciprocal sympathy” between private 
equity and family firms: this is mainly link to the financial and non-financial resources 
that business-owning families can access through such deals and to the greater room for 
improvements and financial returns that private equity funds see in family businesses. 
Plus, our analysis on family firms’ buyouts links these investments to a general increase 
in targets’ sales as well as to increased levels of employment, increased financial debt, 
increased value of fixed assets, lower taxation, lower employees’ productivity and a gen-
eral deterioration of the EBITDA margin. Also, the most successful investments seem to 
occur when well experienced private equity houses target young family businesses with 
poor pre-deal performance in growth and efficiency trends. Last, family firms’ buyouts 
continue to show a strong “discontinuity effect” on sales and EBITDA margin, meaning 
that they frequently turn a negative trend in one of the two variables into a positive one 
or vice versa.  
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4.7 Research limits and future studies 
This study provides some additional evidence on the effects that private equity invest-
ments have on family firms. However, mainly because of accounting rules related to buy-
outs transaction, many of the financial statements’ lines and ratios examined did not lead 
to any relevant conclusion. Thus, in order to improve the analysis, it would be interesting 
to adjust financial data for the effects that follow any assets revaluation. In this way, more 
meaningful insights could be observed with regard to operating performance and profita-
bility. Moreover, to add robustness to the statistical analysis and to further abstract the 
results in terms of industry trends’ influence, the comparison could have been performed 
between private equity targets and non-private equity-backed peers (rather than only be-
tween years pre and post-deals), as in the case of Battistin et al. (2017), Guo et al., (2011), 
or Wilson et al. (2012). Nonetheless, even with this approach, the work would have suf-
fered from some biases due to the fact that private equity investors can observe more 
variables (and thus have an informational advantage) when choosing targets as compared 
to any researcher when choosing the matching peers. 
Following, of particular interest for future researches would be to add evidence on the 
pre-deal characteristics of the best responding family firms. In this sense, if the hypothesis 
made in our conclusions - regarding family firms’ longevity, pre-deal performance, and 
private equity house’ years of experience - were backed by further studies, it would be 
worthy to understand under a more qualitative lens how these variables positively impact 
the value creation process, both in the negotiation and in the post-deal phase.  
Concluding, in order to extend the existing literature (see Vivani et al., 2008) worthy of 
more attention is also the long-term impact of such investments, especially in relation to 
the chosen exit strategy (e.g. family buyback, secondary buyout, IPO, etc.).  
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